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The literature on definitions of security based on causality-like notions such as
noninterference has used several distinct semantic models for systems. Early work was
based on state machine and trace-set definitions; more recent work has dealt with
definitions of security in two distinct process algebraic settings. Comparisons between the
definitions has been carried outmainlywithin semantic frameworks. This paper studies the
relationship between semantic frameworks, by defining mappings between a number of
semantic models and studying the relationship between notions of noninterference under
these mappings.
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1. Introduction
‘‘Noninterference’’ is a term loosely applied in the literature to a class of formal security properties motivated from
considerations of information flow and causality. Since it was invented in [6], several distinct schools have produced a
variety of generalizations of the original notion, each based on their own approach tomodelling systems. Existing definitions
of noninterference can be roughly classified by whether they are framed in the semantic context of state based automaton
models [6,28,16,23,1,27], trace based models [12,14,29,10], or process algebraic based models (further divisible into CSP [9]
and CCS [15] based variants) [3,20,24].
This large diversity of models and definitions leaves a somewhat unsatisfactory situation for the potential users of
this extensive literature. Noninterference originated as a proposed formalisation of information flow security in operating
systems verification, a topic that has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years [27,8,19]. However, the formal
systems models and definitions of security used in this area, and others, tend to be based on state based rather than process
algebraic formalisms. (While the conceptual parsimony of process algebraic models is convenient for theoretical purposes,
it is a disadvantage for the purpose of modelling complex systems. Most approaches to complex systems modelling used in
practice treat state variables as first class citizens, and in particular, the definitions of security used in the recent operating
systems work make explicit reference to state variables.) It remains unclear just what is the significance of the process
algebraic work on noninterference for the application originally motivating this area of research. There have been a number
of survey works and studies of the relationships between definitions in the individual process algebraic schools [24,3] but,
on thewhole, comparisons have been carried outwithin rather than across semantic frameworks. In particular, it is not clear
what the impact of recent process algebraic research is for a user who prefers to work with a state based modelling.
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In this paper, we attempt to bridge some of the gaps between semantic models by considering the relationships between
the various classical semantic models and some of the proposed notions of noninterference. We consider three types of
models: two state based automaton models (introduced in Section 2) and a process algebraic framework (discussed in
Section 5). The semantic intuitions underlying these frameworks are somewhat different. The automaton models have
notions of ‘‘action’’ and of ‘‘observation’’, the latter being a function of state in one case and associated to actions in the other.
The process algebraic framework is seemingly more general, but diverges from the intuitions of the automaton models in
that it treats both actions and observations uniformly as ‘‘active’’. It is desirable to precisely understand the relationship
between these frameworks. We address this question by defining formal mappings (see Sections 4 and 5) between the
semantic frameworks. We study whether a variety of definitions of noninterference (introduced for the automaton models
in Section 3 and for the process algebraic framework in Section 5) in the different frameworks correspond under these
mappings. In particular, we identify two distinct transformations from an automaton theoretic framework to a CCS-like
process algebraic framework. Both seem to capture reasonable idioms for the representation of the automaton theoretic
notions of action and observation in process algebra.
Our results show that for several of the definitions of noninterference in the literature (viz. ‘‘nondeducibility on inputs’’
and ‘‘nondeducibility on strategies’’), similarly named andmotivated definitions in the two automaton theoretic frameworks
and the process algebraic framework do correspond under the translations between these semantic frameworks. This gives
a formal justification for the commonnaming and gives the user of older automaton theoretic definitions confidence that the
process algebraic literature has not superseded older approaches in cases where an automaton basedmodelling is adequate
for the purposes of the application. Moreover, the fact that this correspondence holds under two different mappings from
automata to process algebra shows that there is some flexibility in how we can understand automaton based modellings
from a process algebraic perspective.
However, matters are significantly more subtle for several other definitions of security, viz McCullough’s restrictiveness
[12] and Bevier and Young’s notion of Behavioural Nondeterministic Security [1]. Both are based on a notion of McCullough
unwinding on systems. Behavioural Nondeterministic Security is closest to the definitions of security that have been used in
the literature on information flow in operating systems. This notion has been considered neither in the literature on action-
observed systems, nor in process algebra, so one of the contributions of the paper is to define versions of this notion in these
semantic settings.
For both restrictiveness and Behavioural Nondeterministic Security we find that while definitions of these notions
in the two automaton theoretic frameworks coincide directly, for only one of our two translations from automata to
process algebra does there exist a definition of restrictiveness in the process algebraic literature that corresponds under
the translation. (For restrictiveness, we also find a correspondence under this translation to ‘‘strong bisimulation based
nondeducibility on compositions’’ [3].) However, we are able to develop a novel process algebraic notion of unwinding,
which we call weak McCullough unwinding and show that it yields new notions of security in the process algebraic
setting corresponding precisely to restrictiveness and Behavioural Nondeterministic Security on automata under the second
translation.
Our results highlight some differences in the understanding of action and observation in automata and process algebra.
The automaton model treats observations as obligatory, and not under the control of the agent: an agent cannot avoid
making an observation. On the other hand, a common understanding of process algebra treats all events of an agent as
under their control. The definition of weak unwinding is stated in a way that effectively treats observations as not under
the causal control of the observing agent. In defining Behavioural Nondeterministic Security in the process algebraic setting,
we also need to make sense of the notion of an agent’s ‘‘most recent observation’’ in ways that depend on the translation
being used: in one case observations in the automaton theoretic model are mapped to potential observations in the process
algebraic model, in the other we need a notion of ‘‘most recent observation’’ that includes the agents most recent action.
Our results show that there are, indeed, some subtleties that need to be considered very carefully when modelling a system
in process algebra for purposes of security analysis.
A final aspect of our results is that we show several cases where distinct definitions of security in the process algebraic
framework prove to be equivalent with respect to the range of our mappings from the state based frameworks. There
has been a proliferation of definitions in the process algebraic setting, which may lead a practitioner to question which
of the many new definitions is the appropriate one for their application, and to ask whether classical definitions have
been supplanted by more recent work. Our results indicate that the new definitions are inherently concerned with subtle
distinctions that appear only in the richly expressive framework of the process algebraic semantics. Where a system may
be modelled in the less expressive state based setting, the classical definitions suffice.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define the two state based semantic models we consider: state-
observed and action-observed automata. Section 3 defines the range of security properties we study with respect to each
of these two semantic models. In Section 4, we define mappings between these two state based models, and establish
correspondences between notions of security for these two models. Section 5 defines the process algebraic semantics we
consider, and defines notions of security for this semantics (including our new definitions for weak restrictiveness and
Behavioural Nondeterministic Security in this setting), and shows how these notions correspond to state based notions of
security under two different mappings from automata to processes. We make some concluding remarks in Section 6. The
results of the paper are summarised in Fig. 8 in the conclusion. For the sake of readability we move the proofs of some
auxiliary results into the Appendix.
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2. State based models
The original system models used in the literature on noninterference modelled systems as a type of deterministic
or nondeterministic automaton, in which multiple agents perform actions (give inputs) and make observations (receive
outputs). Similarly to the Moore–Mealy distinction for finite state automata, we find two types of models, depending on
whether observations are associated to states [1] or actions [23]. The original definitions assumed deterministic systems,
but the focus of subsequent work has been on how to generalize the definitions to nondeterministic systems. In general,
these systems are input-total, in the sense that any action canbe taken at any time. In part, themotivation for this assumption
is to prevent enabledness of actions being an additional channel for information flow. An input-total modelling is also the
appropriate one if one takes the stance that the way that a user discovers that an action is not enabled is by attempting the
action and observing in response a signal that the attempt has failed.
A nondeterministic action-observed state machine is a tuple of the form M = ⟨S, s0, next, dom, A,O⟩, where S is a set
of states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of actions, dom : A → D associates with each action an agent1 and write
D for the set of agents, and next : S × A → P (O × S) \ {∅} is a transition function. Here O is a set of observations that
can be made when performing an action. Given a state s ∈ S, and an action a ∈ A, the set next(s, a) is required to be
non-empty. A tuple (o, t) ∈ next(s, a) intuitively represents that on action a it is possible to make a transition from state
s to state t and produce output o. Such a machine is deterministic if next(s, a) is a singleton for all states s and actions a.
In this case, the function next may be replaced by two functions step : S × A → S and out : S × A → O such that
next(s, a) = {(out(s, a), step(s, a))} to obtain the state machine definition one finds, e.g., in [23]. A run of an action-
observed system is a sequence r = s0(a1, o1)s1(a2, o2)s2 . . . (an, on)sn ∈ S((A × O)S)∗ such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(oi, si) ∈ next(si−1, ai). A state s ∈ S is said to be reachable if it occurs in some run. We write Mna for the set of all
nondeterministic action-observed statemachines andMa for the set of deterministic action-observed statemachines,where,
in both cases, all states are reachable.2
A nondeterministic state-observed state machine is a tuple of the formM = ⟨S, s0, next, obs, dom, A,O⟩ where S is a set
of states; s0 ∈ S is the initial state; the function next : S×A → P (S)\{∅} is a transition function, such that next(s, a) defines
the set of states to which it is possible to make a transition when action a ∈ A is performed at a state s ∈ S; the function
dom : A → D associates an agent with each action, and the function obs : S × D → O describes the observation made in
each state by each agent. For readability, we ‘curry’ the function obs by writing obsu(s) for obs(s, u) for u ∈ D and s ∈ S. Such
a state machine is deterministic if next(s, a) is a singleton for all states s and actions a. In this case we may define a function
step : S×A → S by next(s, a) = {step(s, a)}. A run of a state-observed system is a sequence r = s0a1s1a2s2 . . . ansn ∈ S(AS)∗
such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, si ∈ next(si−1, ai). (Here we omit the representation of the observations since these may be
recovered using the function obs.) A state s ∈ S is said to be reachable if it occurs in some run. We writeMns for the set of all
nondeterministic state-observed machines, andMs for the set of all deterministic state-observed machines where, in both
cases, all states are reachable.
The most significant apparent difference between state- and action-observed machines is that, in the former, all agents
make an observation when an action is performed, whereas in the latter, only the agent performing the action does so. Since
the execution model is asynchronous, this means that whereas in action-observed systems, other agents would, unless
they themselves act, have no knowledge that any agent has performed an action, they may come to have this information
in state-observed systems even without acting. However, such a situation would often be a reason for the system to be
declared insecure. The action-observed setting somewhat resembles the process algebraic setting of [2] where agents have
to perform actions to synchronise with the system to achieve the effect of ‘observation’, but differs from it in that it bundles
actions together with observations whereas [2] has separate notions of ‘input’ and ‘output’ actions.
3. Security properties on state based models
We now recall from the literature a number of security properties in the two types of state based systems. We study the
relationships between these properties in Section 4.
3.1. Noninterference
Historically, one of the first information flow properties was (transitive) noninterference [6,7], defined with respect to
deterministic machines. We base our discussion on the presentation of Rushby [23], which has been followed inmany other
1 The nomenclature ‘dom’ and ‘D’ arises from the fact that agents are also called ‘‘domains’’ in the literature. A domain may represent a group of distinct
individual actors (e.g., all people and systems classified to access information at a particular security level). However, we are interested in the collective
capabilities of such a group to act and deduce information, so it is convenient both conceptually and grammatically to think of the group as a single entity
and use agentive language.
2 This restriction is of significance because the definitions and results below that concern unfolding relations are sensitive to unreachable states. A
systemmay always be restricted to its reachable component, and this operation should, intuitively, not have an impact on its security. Thus this restriction
is without loss of generality.
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works. Rushby defines both state-observed [22] and action-observed [23] systems, but treats them independently and does
not consider any direct relations between the two. The classical definitions were cast in terms of security policies describing
permitted information flows between an arbitrary collection of agents. Much of the subsequent literature restricts attention
to the policy L ≤ H with two agents High (H) and Low (L), with information permitted to flow from Low to High but
not from High to Low. For uniformity, we also make this restriction here, and let AH = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = H} and
AL = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = L}.
As noted above, in both state-observed and action-observed deterministic systems, we have a function step : S × A → S
to represent the deterministic state evolution as a result of actions. To represent the result of executing a sequence of actions,
define the operation ◦ : S × A∗ → S, by s ◦ ϵ = s and s ◦ (α · a) = step(s ◦ α, a) for s ∈ S, α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A.
With respect to the simple policy L ≤ H , the definition of noninterference can be described in terms of the operation
purgeL : A∗ → A∗ on sequences of actions that restricts the sequence to the subsequence of actions of L. Intuitively, the
purged High actions are not allowed to lead to any effects observable to L. This is formalised as follows in the definitions of
noninterference following [23], one for each type of system.
Definition 3.1. (1) A system inMna satisfies noninterference if it is deterministic and for all α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ AL, we have
out(s0 ◦ α, a) = out(s0 ◦ purgeL(α), a). We write NIa for the set of such systems.
(2) A system in Mns satisfies noninterference if it is deterministic and if for all α ∈ A∗, we have obsL(s0 ◦ α) = obsL(s0 ◦
purgeL(α)). We write NIs for the set of such systems.
The definitions of noninterference in the two types of system are very similar. We show below that they can be seen to
be equivalent in a precise sense.
3.2. Nondeducibility on inputs
One way of understanding the statement that H does not interfere with L in a deterministic system is stating that every
sequence of H actions is compatible with the actions and observations of L. This leads to the proposal to take a similar
notion as the formulation of noninterference in nondeterministic systems: an approach known as nondeducibility [25].
Nondeducibility is defined in a quite general way, in terms of a pair of views of runs. We focus here on a commonly used
special case: Low’s nondeducibility of High’s actions.
We take an agent u’s view viewu(r) of a run r to be the maximal state of information that it can have in an asynchronous
system: its sequence of actions and observations reducedmodulo stuttering.Webegin by extending the agent’s observations
to runs. In action-observed systems we define the extended observation function Obsau : S((A × O)S)∗ → (AO)∗ for u ∈ D
by Obsau(s) = ϵ and
Obsau(r · (a, o) · s′) =

Obsau(r) · a · o if dom(a) = u
Obsau(r) otherwise.
Here, taking the stance that an agent is aware of each action that it performs (so that if it performs an action twice,
obtaining the same output, it knows that it has performed the action twice) we do not need to apply a stuttering reduction,
and take viewu(r) = Obsau(r). In state-observed systems, the agent makes an observation at each state, and we define
Obssu : S(AS)∗ → O+(AO+)∗ by Obssu(s) = obsu(s), and
Obssu(δ · a · s) =

Obssu(δ) · a · obsu(s) if dom(a) = u
Obssu(δ) · obsu(s) otherwise.
Here the agent might make the same observation several times in a row, without an intervening action by that agent. This
indicates that another agent has acted. To eliminate this timing based reasoning, in order to make the definition compatible
with the assumption of asynchrony, we may take the view to be viewu(r) = Cond(Obssu(r)) where Cond is the function on
sequences that removes consecutive repetitions.
To state the definition of nondeducibility, we also require a function to extract the sequence of actions performed by an
agent. We write Actu(r) for the sequence of actions performed by agent u in run r , and Act(r) the sequence of all actions in
r . We say that a sequence β is a possible view for agent u in a systemM if there exists a run r ofM such that viewu(r) = β .
A sequence α ∈ A∗H and a possible L view β inM are said to be compatible if there exists a run r ofM with ActH(r) = α and
viewL(r) = β .
Definition 3.2. A system M satisfies Nondeducibility on Inputs if for every α ∈ A∗H , and every possible L view β in M , α is
compatible with β . Write NDIs and NDIa for the set of systems inMns andMna (respectively) satisfying nondeducibility on
inputs.
Intuitively, this definition says that Low never learns anything about what actions High has performed.
3.3. Nondeducibility on strategies
Wittbold and Johnson [28] argued that systems classified as secure by nondeducibility on inputsmay nevertheless permit
flows of information flow fromHigh to Low. They present a system inwhich by selecting its actions according to a particular
strategy, High may directly control Low’s observations. They propose an alternate definition they call ‘‘nondeducibility on
strategies’’ which behaves more satisfactorily on the example.
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The framework in which theywork is synchronous statemachines with simultaneous actions. Nevertheless, it is possible
to formulate a similar definition in the asynchronous models defined above. In state-observed systems, we define an
asynchronous High strategy to be a function π : O+(AHO+)∗ → AH ∪ {ϵ} mapping each possible high view to a choice
of High action or the ‘‘noop’’ action ϵ. We say that a run s0a1s1 . . . ansn is consistent with π if dom(ai) = H implies
ai = π(viewH(s0a1s1 . . . ai−1si−1)), for each i = 1 . . . n. Similarly, in action-observed systems, we define an asynchronous
High strategy to be a function π : (AHO)∗ → AH ∪ {ϵ}. A run s0(a1, o1)s1 . . . (an, on)sn is consistent with π if dom(ai) = H
implies ai = π(viewH(s0(a1, o1)s1 . . . (ai−1, oi−1)si−1)). Given a system M ∈ Mna or M ∈ Mns and a strategy π of the
appropriate type, define
AviewL(M, π) = {viewL(r) | r is an run ofM consistent with π}.
Definition 3.3. M is secure wrt Nondeducibility on Strategies (written M ∈ NDSa or M ∈ NDSs, according to M ∈ Mna or
M ∈ Mns) if for all High strategies π , π ′, AviewL(M, π) = AviewL(M, π ′).
It has been shown that in synchronous systems with simultaneous inputs, Nondeducibility on Strategies is strictly
stronger than Nondeducibility on Inputs [28]. However in asynchronous systems this result does not hold, and in fact we
will show that the two notions coincide. Before showing the results we claimed, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. A system M ∈ Mna(Mns) is in NDIa(NDIs) iff every possible L view is compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H .
Proof. The ‘only if’ direction is trivial. For the ‘if’ direction, assume that every possible L view is compatible with ϵ and let β
be a possible L view.
(1) IfM ∈ Mna, we prove by induction that for all α ∈ A∗H , there exists a run r such that viewL(r) = β and ActH(r) = α. The
base case when α = ϵ is trivial by assumption. Suppose for some α ∈ A∗H , there is a run r satisfying viewL(r) = β and
ActH(r) = α, we show the case for α · a. Let s be the last state of r , then there exists s′ ∈ S such that (o, s′) ∈ next(s, a).
Then we have viewL(r(a, o)s′) = viewL(r) by dom(a) ≠ L, and ActH(r(a, o)s′) = α · a.
(2) If M ∈ Mns, we give a similar proof by induction. The base case when α = ϵ is trivial by assumption. Suppose for
some α ∈ A∗, there is a run r satisfying viewL(r) = β and ActH(r) = α, we show the case for α · a. Let s be the last
state of r , then there exists s′ ∈ S such that s′ ∈ next(s, a). We need to show that obsL(s) = obsL(s′). Suppose it were
the case that obsL(s) ≠ obsL(s′), then viewL(ras′) = viewL(r)obsL(s′) which is a sequence ending with obsL(s)obsL(s′).
Then for all runs r ′ with viewL(r ′) = viewL(ras′), it is always the case that ActH(r ′) ≠ ϵ by definition of the function
view, which contradicts the assumption that every possible L observation is compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H . Therefore we have
obsL(s) = obsL(s′), so that viewL(ras′) = viewL(r) = β and ActH(ras′) = α · a. 
Theorem 3.5. NDSa = NDIa and NDSs = NDIs.
Proof. To show that NDS ⊆ NDI we show that ifM ∉ NDI thenM ∉ NDS. By Lemma 3.4,M not in NDI implies there exists
some possible L view β not compatible with the sequence of H actions ϵ, so β is also not consistent with the High strategy
π defined by π(γ ) = ϵ for all H views γ . SoM is not in NDS.
To show that NDI ⊆ NDS, suppose that the system is in NDI . Then every possible L view β is compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H , i.e.,
there exists a run r with viewL(r) = β and ActH(r) = ϵ. Let π be an H-strategy, then π is consistent with r by definition.
(Because it holds vacuously that dom(ai) = H implies ai = π(viewH(s0a1s1 . . . ai−1si−1)) for all i.) This shows that the set
AviewL(M, π) consists of all possible views of L inM , andM ∈ NDS follows. 
A very similar result has previously been noted in a process algebraic setting by Focardi and Gorrieri.3 Theorem 3.5 could
in fact be obtained as a consequence of their results and translation results from state- and action-observed systems that
we present in Section 5. Note that, by Wittbold and Johnson’s example [28], the equivalence does not hold in synchronous
systems.
3.4. Unwinding-like properties
A number of the definitions in the literature on noninterference for nondeterministic systems are closely related to the
following notion, that was originally motivated as a way of facilitating proofs of noninterference for deterministic systems.
Definition 3.6. An unwinding relation for an action-observed deterministic system M ∈ Ma is an equivalence relation ∼L
on the states ofM satisfying the following conditions, for all states s, t and actions a4:
• Output Consistencya: if a ∈ AL and s ∼L t then out(s, a) = out(t, a);
• Locally Respects: if a ∈ AH then s ∼L step(s, a);
3 See [2], in p. 20–21: Theorem 3.27 states NDCIT = NNIIT , and Corollary 3.29 states NNIIT = TNDI ∩ IT . The definition of TNDI resembles that of NDI,
and the definition of NDCIT resembles that of NDS.
4 We present a slight modification of the usual definition, which would have an equivalence relation ∼u for each agent u, satisfying a similar set of
conditions for each u. For the policy L ≤ H we can take∼H to be the identity relation, which automatically satisfies the necessary conditions.
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• Step Consistency: if a ∈ AL and s ∼L t then step(s, a) ∼L step(t, a).
An unwinding relation for a state-observed deterministic system M ∈ Ms is an equivalence relation satisfying Locally
Respects, Step Consistency, and the following variant of Output Consistency.
• Output Consistencys: if s ∼L t then obsL(s) = obsL(t).
We note that unwinding relations are sensitive to the behaviour of systems on unreachable parts of the state space. Since
it is not reasonable that security of a system should depend on unreachable states, as stated before, we recall that we assume
that all systems have been restricted to their reachable states.
The relationship between unwinding conditions and noninterference is given by the following classical results. (A proof
of parts not explicit in the literature is given in the Appendix.)
Theorem 3.7 ([7,23]). (1) If there exists an unwinding relation for a deterministic system M ∈ Mna (M ∈ Mns), then M ∈ NIa
(M ∈ NIs).
(2) If M ∈ NIa (M ∈ NIs) then there exists an unwinding relation for M.
The following is a natural generalization of Definition 3.6 to nondeterministic systems. (Note that Output Consistency
has been incorporated into SC in the unwinding relation forMna.)
Definition 3.8. An unwinding relation for a systemM ∈ Mna is an equivalence relation∼L on the states ofM such that for
all states s, s′, t , actions a, and outputs o,
• LRa: if a ∈ AH and (o, t) ∈ next(s, a) then s ∼L t ,• SCa: if a ∈ AL and s ∼L s′ and (o, t) ∈ next(s, a), then there exists a state t ′ such that (o, t ′) ∈ next(s′, a) and t ∼L t ′.
An unwinding relation for a systemM ∈ Mns is an equivalence relation satisfying
• OCs: if s ∼L t then obsL(s) = obsL(t).• LRs: if a ∈ AH and t ∈ next(s, a) then s ∼L t ,• SCs: if a ∈ AL and s ∼L s′ and t ∈ next(s, a), then there exists t ′ ∈ next(s′, a) such that t ∼L t ′.
Several definitions of noninterference can be expressed in terms of this generalized notion of unwinding. Given the
equivalence of noninterference and the existence of an unwinding relation in deterministic systems (Theorem 3.7), the
following is a natural approach to the generalization of noninterference to nondeterministic systems.
Definition 3.9. M ∈ Mna (M ∈ Mns) satisfies restrictiveness, written M ∈ RESa (M ∈ RESs), if there exists an unwinding
relation forM .
The use of McCullough’s [12] term ‘‘restrictiveness’’ in this definition is non-obvious, since the structure of our definition
differs somewhat from McCullough’s. We justify it later when we discuss McCullough’s work in the context of the process
algebraic definitions treated in Section 5.
Whereas Definition 3.9 obtains a definition of noninterference by asserting that some relation is an unwinding, we can
also obtain a definition of security by requiring that a particular relation is an unwinding. The following is essentially from
[1], and a similar definition is given in [27]. Definitions used in the recent literature on formal verification of information
flow security in operating systems (e.g. [8,19]) are closely related, although these involve other aspects such as scheduling
that go beyond our present asynchronous systems model.
Definition 3.10. M ∈ Mns satisfies Behavioural Nondeterministic Security (M ∈ BNSs) if the relation ∼L on the states of M
defined by s ∼L t if obsL(s) = obsL(t) is an unwinding relation.
Intuitively, this definition says that L’s future observations depend only on L’s current observation and L’s future actions.
This is particularly appropriate whenwe interpret L’s observation as L’s complete state, and wish to express that H is unable
to interfere with this state. A related intuition in action-observed systems is that L’s future observations should depend only
on L’s most recent observation. The literature does not appear to contain any such definition for action-observed systems,
perhaps because states do not necessarily encode the most recent observation. However, by means of a transformation of
the system we may obtain a behaviourally equivalent system in which states do encode the information required.
Before describing the transformation, we note that wemay use the following standard notion tomake precise the notion
of behavioural equivalence. GivenM1,M2 ∈ Mna of the formsM1 = ⟨S1, s10, next1, dom, A⟩ andM2 = ⟨S2, s20, next2, dom, A⟩,
a bisimulation is a relation≈⊆ S1 × S2, such that if s ≈ t and a ∈ A, then
• for all (o, s′) ∈ next1(s, a), there exists (o, t ′) ∈ next2(t, a) such that s′ ≈ t ′,• for all (o, t ′) ∈ next2(t, a), there exists (o, s′) ∈ next1(s, a) such that s′ ≈ t ′.
WriteM1 ≈ M2 if there exists a bisimulation satisfying s10 ≈ s20.
Bisimulation is generally thought to preserve all behavioural properties of a system that are of interest. It seems
reasonable that it should also preserve security properties, but since security properties are neither safety nor liveness
properties, our intuitions on this matter are somewhat less clear.5 The following result shows that, at least in the case of
RESa, our intuitions are upheld. (For proof, see the Appendix).
5 See [26] for an example where an apparently sensible security property is not preserved under bisimulation.
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Lemma 3.11. For M1,M2 ∈ Mna, if M1 ≈ M2 then M1 ∈ RESa iff M2 ∈ RESa.
We now define a transformation of action-observed systems that ensures that states encode themost recent observation
made by each agent.
Definition 3.12. Let UF : Mna → Mna be the unfolding function such that for each M = ⟨S, s0, next, A, dom⟩ the system
UF(M) is the restriction of the system ⟨S ′, s′0, next ′, A, dom⟩ to its set of reachable states, where
• S ′ = S × (D → O ∪ {ε0})
• s′0 = (s0, f0)where f0 is the function with f0(u) = ε0 for all u ∈ D• next ′ : S ′ × A → P (O× S ′) is defined as next ′((s, f ), a) = {(o, (s′, f [dom(a) → o])) | (o, s′) ∈ next(s, a)}.
Here ε0 is a special output denoting no ‘real’ output has been observed to this moment. We use the notation f [u → o] for
the function g that is identical to f except that g(u) = o.
The intuition of thismapping is that it introduces an extra component in the state that remembers themost recent output
for each agent. (The price is to blowup the state space for all these observational possibilities.) This information is extractable
by the functions lastobsu : S ′ → O defined by lastobsu((s, f )) = f (u) for (s, f ) ∈ S ′ and u ∈ D. Wemay now give a definition
of Behavioural Nondeterministic Security on action-observed systems that captures the intuition that L behaviour should
depend only on L’s most recent observation.
Definition 3.13. M ∈ Mna satisfies Behavioural Nondeterministic Security (M ∈ BNSa) if on UF(M) the relation ∼L defined
by s ∼L t if lastobsL(s) = lastobsL(t) is an unwinding relation.
It is not difficult to see that UF(M) and M are bisimilar. As argued above, it is a reasonable intuition that definitions of
security should be preserved under bisimulation, so a test for security of systemM stated in terms ofUF(M) seems justifiable.
Indeed, it also follows that ifM1 andM2 are bisimilar then so are UF(M1) and UF(M2), which further supports this claim.
We now consider how these unwinding based definitions of security are related:
Proposition 3.14. The following inclusions are proper: BNSa ⊂ RESa ⊂ NDIa and BNSs ⊂ RESs ⊂ NDIs.
Proof. (1) To see that BNSa ⊆ RESa, note that if M ∈ BNSa then there exists an unwinding relation on UF(M), thus
UF(M) ∈ RESa. It is obvious thatM ≈ UF(M), soM ∈ RESa by Lemma 3.11.
To show the difference between BNSa and RESa, we have in Fig. 1 the system M1 with S = {s0, s1, s2} and the
transition function next(si, h) = {(0, si)} for i = 0, 1, 2, next(s0, l) = {(0, s0), (0, s1), (0, s2)}, next(s1, l) = {(0, s1)} and
next(s2, l) = {(1, s2)}. ClearlyM1 ∈ RESa since the identity relation on S is an unwinding relation. HoweverM1 ∉ BNSa,
because after performing action l from (s0, f0), the system can be in either state (s1, f ) or (s2, g) with f (L) = g(L) = 0,
hence (s1, f ) ∼L (s2, g), but in one case we have only observation 0 possible on action l, whereas in the other, only
observation 1 is possible on action l, so∼L is not an unwinding relation. Thus RESa ⊈ BNSa.
Next we show that RESa ⊆ NDIa. Let an action-observed system M be in RESa, witnessed by the unwinding relation
∼. Let β ∈ (AO)∗ be a possible L view, then there is a run r = s0(a1, o1)s1 . . . (an, on)sn of M satisfying viewL(r) = β .
We only need to show that β is compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H , by Lemma 3.4. We show this by induction on the length of r ,
proving the stronger statement that there exists a run r ′ with final state t such that t ∼ sn and viewL(r ′) = viewL(r) and
ActH(r ′) = ϵ. The base case is trivial. For the inductive case, consider an extension r1 = r(an+1, on+1)sn+1 of r . By the
inductive hypothesis we have that there exists a run r ′ with final state t such that t ∼ sn and viewL(r ′) = viewL(r) and
ActH(r ′) = ϵ. We need to find a run r ′1 with final state t ′ such that t ′ ∼ sn+1 and viewL(r ′1) = viewL(r1) and ActH(r) = ϵ.
We consider two cases:
• Suppose first that an+1 ∈ AH . Then by LRa we have that sn ∼ sn+1. Since ∼ is an equivalence relation it follows that
t ∼ sn+1. Thus, we may take r ′1 = r ′ and we have satisfied the required conditions, since viewL(r1) = viewL(r) in this
case.
• Suppose that an+1 ∈ AL. Note that in this case, viewL(r1) = viewL(r)an+1on+1. By Step Consistency, there exists
(on+1, t ′) ∈ next(t, an+1) such that sn+1 ∼ t ′. Thus, we may satisfy the required conditions by taking r ′1 =
r ′(an + 1, on+1)t ′.
The inclusion is proper: to show this we have in Fig. 1 the systemM2 with S = {s0, s1, s2} and the transition function
next(s0, h) = {(0, s1)}, next(si, h) = {(0, si)} for i = 1, 2, next(s0, l) = {(0, s1), (1, s2)}, next(s1, l) = {(0, s1)} and
next(s2, l) = {(1, s2)}. It is obvious thatM2 ∈ NDIa. Since L’s views are in the pattern (l, 0)∗+(l, 1)∗, let a possible L view
β be (l, x)(l, x) . . . (l, x)with x ∈ {0, 1}, then there exists a run r = s0(l, x)sx+1(l, x)sx+1 . . . (l, x)sx+1 with viewL(r) = β
and ActH(r) = ϵ. But M2 ∉ RESa. Suppose that ∼ were an unwinding relation on M2. By LRa we must have s0 ∼ s1.
However, (1, s2) ∈ next(s0, l) but for no state t dowe have (1, t) ∈ next(s1, l), contradicting SCa. ThereforeNDIa ⊈ RESa.
(2) For state-observed systems, the result BNSs ⊂ RESs ⊂ NDIs can be proved in a similar way. We remark that the proof
could also be derived from part (1) using the transformations Fsa, Fas, to be introduced in Section 4, that map between
state- and action-observed systems, in such a way as to preserve all the security properties we have defined in this
paper. 
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Fig. 1. Systems distinguishing BNSa , RESa and NDIa .
Fig. 2. A deterministic example in RESa but not in BNSa .
The following result shows that these notions are in fact generalizations of noninterference on deterministic systems.
Proposition 3.15. On deterministic systems, the notions NIa(NIs), NDIa(NDIs) and RESa(RESs) are equivalent.
Proof. Since RESs ⊆ NDIs, to prove that NIs = NDIs = RESs onMs, we only need to show
(1) NDIs ∩ Ms ⊆ NIs. SupposeM ∈ NDIs ∩ Ms. Then for every possible action sequence α ∈ A∗, there exists a run r ∈ S(AS)∗
with Act(r) = α. Let its low observation viewL(r) be β . Then from Lemma 3.4, β is compatible with empty H input, so
there exists a run r ′ with viewL(r ′) = β and ActH(r ′) = ϵ, i.e., Act(r ′) = purgeL(α). FromM ∈ Ms, r and r ′ are the unique
runs for the action sequencesα and purgeL(α). Since they have the same L view, they agree on the last observationwhich
is obsL(s0 ◦ α) = obsL(s0 ◦ purgeL(α)).
(2) NIs ⊆ RESs. SupposeM ∈ NIs. ThenM is deterministic and from Theorem 3.7, there exists an unwinding relation∼L for
NIs, which can be taken to be the unwinding relation for RESs.
Similar results on action-observed systems can be derived from the translation results of Section 4. 
We remark that the containment BNSa ⊂ RESa is proper in deterministic systems. For an example of this, define
M = ⟨S, s0, step, out, dom, A,O⟩ by S = {s0, s1, s2}, A = {l, h} with dom(h) = H and dom(l) = L, O = {0, 1}. The functions
step and out are defined by
• step(si, h) = si and out(si, h) = 0 for i = 0, 1 and 2,
• step(s0, l) = s1 and out(s0, l) = 0,
• step(s1, l) = s2 and out(s1, l) = 0,
• step(s2, l) = s2 and out(s2, l) = 1.
See Fig. 2. It is obvious that the identity relation on S is an unwinding relation. However, after unfolding M , on UF(M) we
will have lastobsL((s1, f )) = lastobsL((s2, g)) = 0 provided f (L) = g(L) = 0, but out((s1, f ), l) = 0 ≠ 1 = out((s2, g), l).
In this section, we have considered four different definitions of security (in each of the two different systems models).
One might be tempted to ask which of these definitions is the ‘‘right’’ one. We would argue that this is the wrong question.
Two of the definitions (Nondeducibility on Inputs and Nondeducibility on Strategies) are both intuitive, and although they turn
out to be equivalent in asynchronous systems, represent quite different assumptions about the attacker. Both deal with L’s
ability to make deductions about H from its observations, but NDI assumes that L is a passive observer with no ability to
control H activity, whereas NDS assumes that Lmay have been able to plant a Trojan horse at H , and concerns the ability of
such a Trojan horse to transmit information to L. Restrictiveness and Behavioural Nondeterministic Security are arguably less
intuitive, and we suggest that they are best understood as proof techniques. We note that when proving something about a
system, it is in general preferable to prove a stronger claim than a weaker claim (subject to the degree of difficulty of the
proof). From this point of view, it is entirely reasonable to prove a stronger property such as BNS, evenwhen one is primarily
interested in a property such as NDI. Although BNS has had little attention in the recent theoretical literature, it is close to the
properties used in operating systems verification literature [19,8]. It is also interesting to note that RES provides a complete
proof technique for noninterference on deterministic systems, by Theorem 3.7.
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Fig. 3. The effect of translation Fas on a state.
Fig. 4. The effect of translation Fsa on a state.
4. Transformations between state based models
We now turn to our main interest in this paper, which is to study the relationship between security properties defined
over different semantic models. For this, we require translations between the two types of models. The intuition underlying
the twomodels introduced above, that agents can both act on and observe their environment is the same, and themodelling
of the dynamics of actions is very closely related. Thus, themajor issue in translation is how to deal with the observations. To
transform action-observed systems into state-observed systems is not too difficult: the essence has already been introduced
in the unfolding construction used for BNSa (Definition 3.12), and we need only modify this construction by erasing
observations from the transitions.
Definition 4.1. Let Fas : Mna → Mns be the translation function such that for each M = ⟨S, s0, next, A, dom⟩, if
UF(M) = ⟨S ′, s′0, next ′, A, dom⟩ and lastobsu : S ′ → O are the associated mappings to observations O, we have Fas(M) =⟨S ′, s′0, next ′′, obs, A, dom⟩, where
next ′′(s, a) = {t | (o, t) ∈ next ′(s, a)}
and obs(s, u) = lastobsu(s).
The range of Fas is a proper subset ofMns, because in any Fas(M), for any u, v ∈ D, u cannot modify v’s observation before
v gives any input. It is plain that ifM is deterministic, then so is Fas(M), so also Fas : Ma → Ms.
The effect of the translation Fas on a state s is illustrated in Fig. 3. Let Au = {a1, a2} for some u ∈ {H, L}, then for u, state
s is split into two states (s, f ) and (s, f ′) with f (u) = o1 and f ′(u) = o2. However, (s, f ) and (s, f ′) behave identically with
respect to future observations of u.
It is also possible to translate state-observed systems to action-observed systems. An apparent obstacle, however, is that
whereas in action-observed systems, an action gives a new observation only to the agent performing the action, an action
in a state-observed system may also give a new observation to others. In the following definition, we handle the need to
model these additional effects by mapping the state observations to potential observations, that would be obtained if the
agent were to look at the state. Thus, we define a translation that equips each agent u with a new action looku that enables
the agent to obtain its observation from the current state, without changing that state.
Definition 4.2. Let Fsa : Mns → Mna be the function such that for each M = ⟨S, s0, next, obs, A, dom⟩, we have Fsa(M) =
⟨S, s0, next ′, A′, dom′⟩, where:
(1) A′ = A ∪ {looku | u ∈ D},
(2) next ′ : S × A′ → P (O× S) is defined by
(a) next ′(s, a) = {(o, t) | t ∈ next(s, a) ∧ o = obsdom(a)(t)} for a ∈ A,
(b) next ′(s, looku) = {(obsu(s), s)} for u ∈ D,
(3) dom′ = dom ∪ {⟨looku, u⟩ | u ∈ D}.
The effect of the translation Fsa on a state is illustrated in Fig. 4. Let dom(a) = u, then one additional self-transition, labelled
by (looku, o) is introduced for u in the resulting action-observed system, which replaces the obligatory observation ‘‘o’’ by a
potential observation.
We note that this translation produces a systemwith significantly more runs and views than the original state-observed
system. This comes about because agents may, by failing to perform a look action, omit to make an observation they would
have made in the state-observed system, or may perform a look action multiple times in the same state. The former, in
particular, means that there exist runs in which agents have a ‘‘state of information’’ that would not have occurred in the
state-observed system. We would not expect, therefore, that all ‘‘information theoretic’’ properties will be preserved by
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these translations. Nevertheless, we may prove that the properties discussed above correspond under the translations. The
following result can be understood as confirming a key intuition concerning security properties and observations: a system
is insecure if an agent is able to obtain prohibited information. Thus, modifying the system by permitting additional runs in
which agents make fewer observations and uninformative (e.g., repeat) observations does not change the satisfaction of the
security property.
Theorem 4.3. Let P be any of the properties NI,NDI,NDS, BNS, RES. Then
(1) for all M ∈ Mna, we have M ∈ Pa iff Fas(M) ∈ Ps, and
(2) for all M ∈ Mns, we have M ∈ Ps iff Fsa(M) ∈ Pa.
Proof. We show this when P is one of NDI, RES or BNS. If P is NI , then NIa(NIs) coincides with NDIa(NDIs) by
Proposition 3.15, sowe obtain the result from the case forNDI . Similarly, ifP isNDS, the result follows using the equivalence
of NDI and NDS (Theorem 3.5).
If P is NDI:
(1) We first show that M ∈ NDIs iff Fsa(M) ∈ NDIa. From Lemma 3.4, we only need to show all possible L views in M are
compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H iff possible L views in Fsa(M) are compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H .
For the ‘if’ part, let Fsa(M) ∈ NDIa and let β ∈ O+(ALO+) be a possible L view on M . We need to show that β is
compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H . There exists a run r of M with viewL(r) = β . Note that in r , every transition t ∈ next(s, a)
with a ∈ AH , has obsL(s) = obsL(t). Otherwise if we map r to Fsa(M) and insert lookL actions at each state encountered,
we get a run r ′ of Fsa(M) such that viewL(r ′) contains a subsequence (lookL o) (lookL o′) with o ≠ o′. Then viewL(r ′) is
incompatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H , which contradicts Fsa(M) ∈ NDIa.
Assume that β ∈ O(ALO)∗ is a possible L view of M and let r0 = s0a1s1 . . . ansn be a run of M with viewL(r0) = β .
By Definition 4.2, Fsa(M) has the same state space. Mapping r0 to Fsa(M) and adding an initial lookL action, we obtain
a run r1 = s0(lookL, o0)s0(a1, o1)s1 . . . (an, on)sn of Fsa(M), where each oi = obsdom(ai)(si). Taking xi ≥ 0 to be the
index of the ith action by L in this sequence, we have viewL(r1) = (lookL, o0)(ax1 , ox1) . . . (axm , oxm). In addition,
obsL(sxj) = obsL(sxj+1) = . . . = obsL(sxj+1−1) = oxj for all 0 ≤ j ≤ m. So it is obvious that viewL(r1) = lookL · β .
Since Fsa(M) ∈ NDIa, viewL(r1) is incompatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H , so there exists a run r2 of Fsa(M)with viewL(r ′2) = viewL(r1)
and ActH(r2) = ϵ. We may write
r2 = s0(lookL, o0)s0(ax1 , o1)s′1 . . . (axm , om)s′m.
Again by Definition 4.2, we map r2 toM as r3 = s0ax1s′1 . . . axms′m. It is clear that viewL(r3) = β and ActH(r3) = ϵ.
For the ‘only if’ part, suppose M ∈ NDIs and let β ∈ ((AL ∪ {lookL})O)∗ be a possible L view on Fsa(M). We need to
show that β is compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H . Let r be a run of Fsa(M) such that viewL(r) = β . Note that every observation on
β returned after a lookL must be the same as the observation returned by the nearest preceding L action, otherwise this
indicates that H has done something, and mapping r back toM this will contradictM ∈ NDIs.
Defineβ ′ ∈ ((AL∪{lookL})O)∗ by deleting all lookL pairs in β but adding the pair (lookL, obsL(s0)) at the beginning. It is
clear thatβ ′ is a possible view of Fsa(M) and ifβ ′ is compatiblewith ϵ then so isβ . Dropping the initial lookL andmapping
r to M we get a run r ′ with lookL · viewL(r ′) = β ′. From M ∈ NDIs there exists a run r ′′ with viewL(r ′′) = viewL(r ′) and
ActH(r ′′) = ϵ. Mapping r ′′ back to Fsa(M), we obtain that β ′ is compatible with ϵ ∈ A∗H . That β is compatible with ϵ
immediately follows.
(2) The proof that M ∈ NDIa iff Fas(M) ∈ NDIs is similar to that above, but more straightforward. For the ‘if’ part, let
β ∈ (ALO)∗ be a possible L view onM . Then there exists a run r0 onM with viewL(r0) = β . Mapping r0 to Fas(M), we get
a run r1 with viewL(r1) = ε0 ·β , because fromDefinition 4.1, no agent can change the other agent’s observation on states
directly. From Fas(M) ∈ NDIs, there exists a run r2 with viewL(r2) = ε0 · β and ActL(r2) = ϵ. Using Definition 4.1, we
map r2 back toM , obtaining a run r3 such that ActL(r3) = ϵ and viewL(r3) = β . The ‘only if’ part can be proved similarly.
If P is RES:
We show that if M ∈ RESs iff Fsa(M) ∈ RESa. We write next for the transition function in M and next ′ for the transition
function in Fsa(M).
(1) For the ‘only if’ part. Suppose M ∈ Mns is in RESs, then there exists an equivalence relation ∼L on M satisfying OCs, LRs
and SCs. Note thatM and Fsa(M) have the same set of states. We show that the same relation∼L satisfies the conditions
LRa and SCa in Fsa(M).
LRa: Suppose a ∈ AH and (o, t) ∈ next ′(s, a). We need to show that s ∼L t . There are two cases: a = lookH and a ∈ AH
inM . If a = lookH , then t = s and s ∼L t follows from the fact that∼L is reflexive. If a ∈ AH , then by construction
of Fsa(M)we have t ∈ next(s, a), hence s ∼L t by LRs.
SCa: Suppose a ∈ AL, s ∼L s′ and (o, t) ∈ next ′(s, a) in Fsa(M). We need to show that there exists a state t ′ such that
(o, t ′) ∈ next ′(s′, a) and t ∼L t ′. There are two cases: a = lookL and a ∈ AL in M . If a = lookL then t = s and
o = obsL(s). By OCs, we have obsL(s) = obsL(s′). Thus, taking t ′ = s′, we have (o, t ′) ∈ next ′(s′, a) and t ∼L t ′
as required. In the case a ∈ AL in M , we have t ∈ next(s, a) and o = obsL(t). Since M satisfies SCs, there exists
t ′ ∈ next(s′, a) such that t ∼L t ′. By OCs, this implies that obsL(t ′) = obsL(t) = o. Thus (o, t ′) ∈ next(s′, a) as
required.
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(2) For the ‘if’ part, suppose Fsa(M) is in RESa. Then there exists an equivalence relation∼L on Fsa(M) satisfying LRa and SCa.
We show that the same relation∼L satisfies OCs, LRs and SCs onM .
OCs: If s ∼L t , then by SCa, s and t will have the same observation on the (unique) transition of lookL, so obsL(s) = obsL(t).
LRs: For a ∈ AH , if t ∈ next(s, a), then by the definition of Fsa there exists (o, t) ∈ next ′(s, a), and s ∼L t follows by LRa.
SCs: For a ∈ AL, suppose s ∼s t and s′ ∈ next(s, a). Then from the definition of Fsa, (o, s′) ∈ next ′(s, a) (where
o = obsL(s′)). By SCa, there exists a state t ′ such that (o, t ′) ∈ next ′(t, a) and s′ ∼L t ′. By construction, t ′ ∈ next(t, a),
so this provides the required state.
On Fas, this is similar to the proof for F 1al in Theorem 5.24.
If P is BNS:
(1) We show that M ∈ BNSa iff Fas(M) ∈ BNSs. Now M ∈ BNSa if UF(M) with the relation (s, f ) ∼L (t, g) iff f (L) = g(L)
satisfies the conditions LRa and SCa. The system Fas(M) has the same set of states, initial states and actions as UF(M), and
is in BNSs if it satisfies the conditions OCs,LRs and SCs with respect to the same relation∼L. The transition relations next
on UF(M) and next ′ on Fas(M) are related by (o, (t, g)) ∈ next((s, f ), a) iff (t, g) ∈ next ′((s, f ), a) and o = g(dom(a)).
The equivalence reduces to a straightforward comparison of the required conditions.We show that if SCs holds in Fas(M)
then SCa holds in UF(M). Let a ∈ AL and (o, (t, g)) ∈ next((s, f ), a) and (s, f ) ∼L (s′, f ′). Then (t, g) ∈ next ′((s, f ), a)
and o = g(dom(a)). By SCs, there exists (t ′, g ′) ∈ next ′((s′, f ′), a) such that (t, g) ∼L (t ′, g ′), i.e., g(L) = g ′(L). Thus,
g ′(L) = o, and we have (o, (t ′, g ′)) ∈ next((s′, f ′), a) and (t, g) ∼L (t ′, g ′), as required for SCa. The converse and the
remaining conditions are similarly straightforward and are left to the reader.
(2) For the proof that M ∈ BNSs iff Fsa(M) ∈ BNSa, let M = ⟨S, s0, next, obs, A, dom⟩, Fsa(M) = ⟨S, s0, next ′, A ∪
{lookH , lookL}, dom⟩, and UF(Fsa(M)) = ⟨S ′, s′0, next ′′, A ∪ {lookH , lookL}, dom⟩. Note that Fsa(M) has the same state
space asM . We have the following properties of the constructions:
P1. for all s, t1, t2 ∈ S and a1, a2 ∈ A with dom(a1) = dom(a2), if (o1, s) ∈ next ′(t1, a1) and (o2, s) ∈ next ′(t2, a2) then
o1 = o2.
P2. For all s ∈ S, if fs ∈ OD is the functionwith fs(L) = obsL(s) and fs(H) = obsH(s), then (s, fs) is reachable inUF(Fas(M)).
The first is direct from Definition 4.2. For (P2), a straightforward induction shows that if s is reachable, then (s, g) is
reachable for some g , and a further lookL and lookH step from this state reach (s, fs).
SupposeM ∈ BNSs. Then we have the additional properties:
P3. For all (s, f ) ∈ S ′, if f (L) ≠ ε0 then obsL(s) = f (L).
P4. For all (s, f ) ∈ S ′, if f (L) = ε0 then obsL(s) = obsL(s0).
For (P4), note that if (s, f ) reachable from (s0, f0), there exists a run inUF(Fsa(M)) of the form (s0, f0)a1(s1, f1)a2(s1, f2) . . .
an(s, f ) with ai ∈ AH for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By the definition of UF and Fsa, s0a1 . . . ansn is a run ofM , and it follows by LRs
that obsL(s) = obsL(s0). The argument for (P3) is similar, starting from the state reached by the last action of L in the run
leading to (s, f ).
Since M ∈ BNSs, the relation ∼ on S defined by s ∼ t if obsL(s) = obsL(t) satisfies LRs and SCs. We need to show
the relation ∼′ on S ′ defined by (s, f ) ∼′ (t, g) if f (L) = g(L) satisfies LRa and SCa in UF(Fsa(M)). Observe that if
(s, f ) ∼′ (t, g) then s ∼ t , because if f (L) and g(L) are both equal ε0, then obsL(s) = obsL(t) = obsL(s0), by (P4); else if
neither equals ε0, then obsL(s) = f (L) = g(L) = obsL(t), by (P3).
(a) For LRa, if a ∈ AH ∪ {lookH} it follows from the definition of UF that for all (o, (t, g)) ∈ next ′′((s, f ), a) we have
f (L) = g(L), hence (s, f ) ∼′ (t, g).
(b) For SCa, suppose a ∈ AL ∪ {lookL} and (s, f ) ∼′ (t, g) and (o, (s′, f ′)) ∈ next ′′((s, f ), a). By the above observation,
we have obsL(s) = obsL(t), i.e., s ∼ t . In the case a ∈ AL, by Definitions 4.2 and 3.12, there exists s′ ∈ next(s, a)
with obsL(s′) = o and f ′ = f [L → o]. By BNSs there exists t ′ ∈ next(t, a) with obsL(t ′) = o. Then we have
(o, (t ′, g[L → o])) ∈ next(t, a), and (s′, f ′) ∼′ (t ′, g[L → o]), as required for SCa. In the case a = lookL, we have
(s′, f ′) = (s, f [L → obsL(s)]) ∼′ (t, f [L → obsL(t)]) ∈ next ′′((t, g), lookL), as required for SCa.
IfUF(Fsa(M)) ∈ BNSa, then∼′ satisfies LRa and SCa, andwe need to show that∼ satisfies LRs and SCs (OCs is immediate
from the definition).
(a) For LRs, let t ∈ next(s, a), where a ∈ AH . By Definitions 4.2 and 3.12, and by (P2), (s, fs) is reachable and
(o, (t, g)) ∈ next ′′((s, fs), a) where o = obsH(t) and g = fs[H → o]. Now, (s, fs) ∼′ (t, g) and (obsL(s), (s, fs)) ∈
next ′′((s, fs), lookL). Thus, there exists, by SCa, a state (t ′, g ′) such that (obsL(s), (t ′, g ′)) ∈ next ′′((t, g), lookL) and
(s, fs) ∼′ (t ′, g ′). By the definition of Fsa and UF , next ′′((t, g), lookL) = {(obsL(t), (t, g[L → obsL(t)]))}. It follows
that obsL(t) = obsL(s).
(b) For SCs, suppose s ∼ t . By (P2), (s, fs) and (t, ft) are reachable, and obviously, (s, fs) ∼′ (t, ft). If s′ ∈ next(s, a) with
a ∈ AL, by definition, (o, (s′, fs[L → o])) ∈ next ′′((s, fs), a), where o = obsL(s′). Since ∼′ satisfies SCa, there exists
(t ′, g) such that (o, (t ′, g)) ∈ next ′′((t, ft), a), and (s′, fs[L → o]) ∼′ (t ′, g). But, by the definition of UF and Fsa, the
only such transition has g = ft [L → obsL(t ′)], so this implies obsL(s′) = o = obsL(t ′) (i.e., s′ ∼ t ′), and t ′ ∈ next(t, a),
as required for SCs. 
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Fig. 5. The effect of translation F 1al on a state.
5. Transformations to a process algebraic model
Since the development of the original noninterference definitions, research has moved to how these definitions may be
generalized to systems defined in process algebra. In this section, we study the relationships between definitions of security
in the state machine models with definitions in a process algebraic setting.
5.1. Process algebraic definitions
Work on security based in process algebra has been conducted within the framework of the process algebra CSP [9],
surveyed in [24], as well as the framework of a variant called SPA of the process algebra CCS [15], surveyed in [3]. We focus
here on the latter, which is closer to themodels considered above in that it distinguishes inputs and outputs (corresponding
loosely to actions and observations). It is also cast in terms of a common semantics for both the CSP and CCS approaches,
viz., labelled transition systems.
Definition 5.1. A labelled transition system (LTS) is a quadrupleM = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩whereL is the set of event labels, P is
the set of processes (or states), p0 is the initial process (or state), and→⊆ P × (L ∪ {τ })× P is the transition relation.
A run of M is a sequence p0
l1→ p1 l2→ p2 . . . pn−1 ln→ pn, and the states that occur in a run are said to be reachable. The
corresponding trace of L is the sequence of labels l1 . . . ln with any occurrences of τ deleted. We write T (M) for the set of
traces ofM . We write L for the set of all LTSs in which all states are reachable.
In CCS, there is also a self-inverse bijection · : L→ L and the set of events L is partitioned into a set I of input events
and the set O = {a|a ∈ I} of output events. Intuitively, the input event a may synchronise with the output event a when
composing processes. We write LIO(I) for the set of all LTS’s with inputs I and corresponding set of outputs O = {a|a ∈ I},
or simply LIO when I is clear.
In order to study security definitions, Focardi and Gorrieri [2] enhance CCS by an orthogonal partitioning of the space of
events into High and Low events. Combining the two distinctions, the set L of all events is thereby partitioned into High
inputs (denoted HI), High outputs (HO), Low inputs (LI) and Low outputs (LO). They call the resulting process calculus SPA.
Apparently, labelled transition systems are more general than the state machine models discussed above, in that inputs
are not always enabled. Superficially, SPA’s labelled transition systems seem closest to action-observed state machines,
inasmuch as both inputs (actions) and outputs (observations) are associated to transitions. Given the equivalences discussed
above, we therefore focus on translating action-observed machines into SPA. However, whereas action-observed machines
combine an action and an observation into a single state transition, SPA separates the two notions. This leaves open several
plausible translations fromMna toLIO. One follows an approach like that used above for the translation fromMna toMns, and
treats the observations as optional eventswhich do not change the state.We assume in the following that the sets of possible
H and L observations in an action-observed system are disjoint. This is without loss of generality, since we may always
rename the H observations, which does not affect any of the notions of security, since these do not refer to H observations.
Similarly, we assume that the sets of actions and observations are disjoint. (Note the H and L actions are already separated
by the function dom.)
Definition 5.2. Let F 1al : Mna → LIO be the mapping such that ifM = ⟨S, s0, next, dom, A⟩, we have F 1al(M) is the restriction
to its reachable states of ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩where
(1) P = S × (O ∪ {εH , εL})D,
(2) p0 = (s0, f0)where f0 is the function with f0(L) = εL and f0(H) = εH ,
(3) L = I ∪ Owith I = A,
(4) (s, f )
l−→ (t, g) iff either l = a ∈ A and for some o ∈ O we have (o, t) ∈ next(s, a) and g = f [dom(a) → o], or
(t, g) = (s, f ) and l = f (u) for some u ∈ D and f (u) ∈ O.
R. van der Meyden, C. Zhang / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 4123–4147 4135
Fig. 6. The effect of translation F 2al on a state.
The effect of translation F 1al on a single state is illustrated in Fig. 5, where the state in the middle of the left-hand side is split
into two states with different self-transitions for the observations o1 and o2.
Another approach to the translation, which keeps observations obligatory, is to introduce for each state s and action a a
new state (s, a) to represent that the action a has been taken from state s, but the corresponding observation has not yet
been made. This translation is depicted in Fig. 6.
Definition 5.3. Let F 2al : Mna → LIO such that forM = ⟨S, s0, next, dom, A⟩, we have Fal(M) = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩where
(1) P = S ∪ (S × A),
(2) p0 = s0,
(3) L = I ∪ Owith I = A,
(4) →= {(s, a, (s, a)) | s ∈ S, a ∈ A} ∪ {((s, a), o, t) | (o, t) ∈ next(s, a)}.
Focardi and Gorrieri discuss the condition of input-totality in the context of relating their definitions of security on SPA
processes to classical definitions. An LTSM ∈ LIO(I) is input-total if for all s ∈ P and for all a ∈ I , there exists t ∈ P such that
s
a−→ t . It is apparent that for all M ∈ Mna, the LTS F 1al(M) is input-total, but the LTS F 2al(M) is not input-total, since inputs
are not accepted in the intermediate states (s, a). We will discuss below the impact this difference has on the relationship
between definitions of security inMna and LIO.
We now state a number of the definitions of security discussed by Focardi and Gorrieri. Given a trace t of an LTS in LIO,
we write low(t) for the subsequence of labels in LI ∪ LO, high(t) for the subsequence of labels in HI ∪ HO, and highinput(t)
for the subsequence of labels in HI . We extend these functions to apply pointwise to sets of traces. We call a sequence in
low(T (M)) a possible low view ofM .
Definition 5.4. M ∈ LIO is secure wrt Nondeterministic Noninterference (M ∈ NNIl) if for every possible low view
α ∈ low(T (M)), there exists a trace t ∈ T (M) such that low(t) = α and highinput(t) = ϵ is the null sequence.
This definition permits the trace t to contain high outputs. The following stronger definition prohibits this.
Definition 5.5. M ∈ LIO is secure wrt Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference (M ∈ SNNIl) if for every possible low
observation α ∈ low(T (M)), there exists a trace t ∈ T (M) such that low(t) = α and high(t) = ϵ is the null sequence.
The following is a formulation of nondeducibility on inputs in LIO.
Definition 5.6. M ∈ LIO is secure wrt Nondeducibility on Inputs (M ∈ NDIl) if for every α ∈ HI∗, for every possible low
view β ∈ low(T (M)), there exists a trace t ∈ T (M) such that low(t) = β and highinput(t) = α.
Finally, we have a definition that is motivated as a generalization of nondeducibility on strategies. This can be phrased6
in terms of a process composition with synchronisation on High events, which we formulate as follows. Given LTSs M1 =
⟨P1, p1,→1,L1⟩ and M2 = ⟨P2, p2,→2,L2⟩, define the composition M1||HM2 = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩ with states P = P1 × P2,
initial state p0 = (p1, p2), labelsL = L1 ∪ L2, and transitions defined by (s, t) l−→ (s′, t ′) if either l ∈ LI ∪ LO and one of
s
l−→ s′ and t = t ′ or s = s′ and t l−→ t ′, or else l = τ and there exists events l1, l2 in HI ∪HO such that l1 = l2 and s l1−→ s′
and t
l2−→ t ′.
Definition 5.7. M ∈ LIO is secure wrt Nondeducibility on Compositions (M ∈ NDCl) if for everyM ′ ∈ LIO that has labels in
HI ∪ HO only, we have low(T (M)) = low(T (M||HM ′)).
Intuitively, process composition is used here to capture the effect of High executing a strategy in the systemM . In effect,
the definition compares two different behaviours of High, since the term M represents the effect of High not constraining
its behaviour in any way, whereasM||HM ′ represents the behaviours resulting when High restricts its behaviour to one that
may synchronise withM ′.
The range of quantification forM ′ in this definition is arguably too large, since it encompasses processes that may refuse
to synchronise with High output events in M , by not having the corresponding input event enabled. Prima facie, it would
seem that this is an issue for comparisons with nondeducibility on strategies in the system models discussed above, where
there is no way for an agent to refuse an observation. Focardi and Gorrieri also consider the following variant NDCIT , which
constrains the LTSs in question to be input-total. We define this in terms of a looser notion NDC(IT )l, to separate input-
totality of the system itself from input-totality of the composed systems.
6 We simplify the presentation of Focardi and Gorrieri to minimize the amount of process algebraic notation that we need to introduce.
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Definition 5.8. M ∈ LIO(HI ∪ LI) is secure wrt Nondeducibility on Compositions with Input-Total systems (M ∈ NDC(IT )l)
if for every input-total M ′ ∈ LIO(HI), we have low(T (M)) = low(T (M||HM ′)). Define M ∈ NDCITl if M is itself input-total
andM ∈ NDC(IT )l.
Intuitively, restricting M ′ to be input-total ensures that M ′ cannot block any H output events from M in the composed
systemM||HM ′.
5.2. Nondeducibility based definitions
We are now ready to begin investigating the relationship between the definitions of security in action-observed systems
and LIO, under the transformations defined above. In this subsection we deal with nondeducibility based definitions. Later
subsections treat restrictiveness and BNS.
Concerning nondeducibility on inputs, we obtain the following.
Theorem 5.9. For all systems M ∈ Mna we have M ∈ NDIa iff F 1al(M) ∈ NDIl iff F 2al(M) ∈ NDIl.
Proof. (1) We show thatM ∈ NDIa iff F 1al(M) ∈ NDIl. Suppose thatM ∈ NDIa. Let β0 ∈ low(T (F 1al(M))) be a possible L view
of F 1al(M) and let α be any sequence of H inputs, i.e., α ∈ HI∗. To show F 1al(M) ∈ NDIl we need to show that there exists a
trace t with low(t) = β0 and highinput(t) = α. Since β0 ∈ low(T (F 1al(M))) there exists a run of F 1al(M)with trace t0 and
low(t0) = β0. Note first that we still have a trace if we delete any HO events, since, by construction of F 1al(M), these do
not change the state.
Note the following property of F 1al(M): if a ∈ LI , o ∈ LO and γ2 ∈ (HI ∪ HO ∪ LO)∗ and γ1, γ3 are any sequences of
labels, then γ1aγ2oγ3 is a trace iff γ1aoγ2γ3 is a trace. This follows from the fact that transitions with labels in HO ∪ LO
do not change the state and for transitions (s, f )
a−→ (s′, f ′)with a ∈ HI we have f ′(L) = f (L).
Thus, we may ensure that there is a LO event immediately after each LI = AL event, and delete any other LO events
(including εL events). Let t1 be the resulting trace andβ1 = low(t1). Thenβ1 ∈ (ALO)∗, and any consecutive pair ao ∈ ALO
in this sequence corresponds in the witnessing run to a sequence of transitions (s, f )
a−→ (t, g) o−→ (t, g). This means
that (o, t) ∈ next(s, a) inM , and it follows that β1 is a possible low view inM . Thus, by the assumption thatM ∈ NDIa,
there exists a run r of M with viewL(r) = β1 and ActH(r) = α. Mapping r to F 1al(M) by including a self-transition for
each observation, we obtain a run of F 1al(M) with trace t2 such that low(t2) = β1 and highinput(t2) = α. We now note
that this trace can be modified into a trace t3 with low(t3) = β0 and highinput(t3) = α by application of the property of
F 1al(M) noted above.
Conversely, suppose F 1al(M) ∈ NDIl and let β be a possible L view ofM and α ∈ A∗H . The run ofM witnessing β maps
directly over to a run of F 1al(M) with trace t such that low(t) = β . Thus, there exists a run of F 1al(M) with trace t2 with
low(t2) = β and highinput(t2) = β . Since output events do not change the state in F 1al(M), we may assume that there
are no HO events. Similarly, using the property of F 1al(M) noted above, we may assume that each LI event is followed
immediately by an LO event, and these are the only LO events in t2. The run now immediately translates back to a run r ′
ofM with viewL(r ′) = β and ActH(r ′) = α.
(2) The proof that M ∈ NDIa iff F 2al(M) ∈ NDIl is similar, but more straightforward, since each run on M can be directly
translated into a trace on F 2al(M) and vice versa. 
Thus, both transformations produce LTS representations of the system that are equivalent with respect to the property
of nondeducibility on input. Since nondeducibility on strategies is equivalent to nondeducibility on input onMna, this result
gives us a way of checking the former property through a mapping to LIO. However, it remains of interest to check whether
the notion of nondeducibility defined on LIO corresponds to that onMna. This is particularly so as Focardi and Gorrieri show
that the placement of nondeducibility on compositionwith respect to the other properties is somewhat sensitive to the class
of systems to which it is applied, and the class of systems used in the compositions. Focardi and Gorrieri prove the following
relationships:
Proposition 5.10 ([2]). (1) NDCl = SNNIl ⊂ NNIl, and
(2) NDIl ⊂ NNIl
(3) NDIl ⊈ NDCl and NDCl ⊈ NDIl
(4) NDCl ∩ IT = NNIl ∩ IT = NDIl ∩ IT .
We add to this the following result, which clarifies the relationship between these notions and NDCIT = NDC(IT )l ∩ IT .
Proposition 5.11. NDC(IT )l = NNIl and NDCl ∩ IT = NDC(IT )l ∩ IT .
Proof. To see that NDC(IT )l ⊆ NNIl, suppose that M ∈ NDC(IT )l. Let M ′ = ∑a∈HI a.M ′ be the input-total process
that accepts all H outputs from M but itself generates no H outputs, (i.e., inputs to M). Since M ∈ NDC(IT )l we have
low(T (M)) = low(T (M||HM ′)). Thus, for all low views β ∈ low(T (M)), there exists a run r of M||HM ′ with low(r) = β .
Since M ′ contains no HO events, any τ events of r must arise as the combination of a HO event from M and a HI event
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from M ′; no HO events from M can have been used in r . Hence, r arises from a run r ′ of M such that low(r ′) = β and
highinput(r ′) = ϵ, as required forM ∈ NNIl.
Conversely, for NNIl ⊆ NDC(IT )l, suppose that M ∈ NNIl. Let M ′ be any input-total High process. To show that
M ∈ NDC(IT )l, we prove that low(T (M)) ⊆ low(T (M||HM ′)); the converse is obvious. Let β ∈ low(T (M)). Since M ∈ NNIl,
there exists a run r ofM with low(r) = β and highinput(r) = ϵ. This means that the only H events in r are HO events, which
synchronise with HI events inM ′. SinceM ′ is input-total, we can construct from r a run r ′ ofM||HM ′, in which the HO events
are replaced by τ , and which satisfies low(r ′) = β .
We now obtain that NDCl ∩ IT = NDC(IT )l ∩ IT from the fact that NDC(IT )l = NNIl and Proposition 5.10(4). 
That is, on input-total systems, input-total High processes have the same discriminative powers as all processes. Using
the fact that F 1al produces input-total LTSs, the equivalence ofNDSa andNDIa and the facts from the previous twopropositions,
we obtain a direct correspondence between nondeducibility on strategies and several notions of nondeducibility on
composition.
Corollary 5.12. For M ∈ Mna, we have M ∈ NDSa iff F 1al(M) ∈ NDCITl iff F 1al(M) ∈ NDC(IT )l iff F 1al(M) ∈ NDCl.
This means that on input-total systems, and hence on the range of F 1al, the notions NDCl, NDC(IT )l, NDCITl, NDIl and
NNIl collapse. Although the processes produced by the translation F 2al are not input-total, there turns out to be similar
correspondence for F 2al. A number of technical reasons are responsible for this. One contributing factor is the following
intuitive notion.
Say that a process isHigh-reactive if for all traces t , if highinput(t) = ϵ then high(t) = ϵ. Intuitively, this says that no High
output is produced before any High input has been received. Proposition 5.10(1) states that SNNIl is strictly stronger than
NNIl. On High-reactive processes, the distinct notions NNIl and SNNIl = NDCl are identical. This follows from the following
fact.
Proposition 5.13. If M is High-reactive then M ∈ NNIl implies M ∈ SNNIl.
Proof. SupposeM ∈ NNI . Let β be any low view ofM . Then byM ∈ NNI there exists a trace t ofM with highinput(t) = ϵ.
SinceM is High-reactive, we in fact have highinput(t) = ϵ, as required forM ∈ SNNIl. 
It is evident that processes of the form F 2al(M) forM ∈ Mna are High-reactive, so it follows that F 2al(M) ∈ NNIl = NDC(IT )l
iff F 2al(M) ∈ SNNIl = NDCl. Furthermore, these processes have a somewhat more technical property that also implies that
F 2al(M) ∈ NDIl iff F 2al(M) ∈ NNIl, viz., that they allow insertion of an arbitrary sequence of high inputs near the end of any
trace, without perturbing the low view or preventing the occurrence of a final low input. This is made more precise in the
proof of the following result.
Proposition 5.14. For M ∈ Mna, if F 2al(M) ∈ NNIl then F 2al(M) ∈ NDIl.
Proof. Suppose F 2al(M) ∈ NNIl. As just noted, this also implies that F 2al(M) ∈ SNNIl. Let β be any low view of M and let α
be any sequence of High inputs. Since F 2al(M) ∈ SNNIl there exists a run r of F 2al(M) with low(r) = β and high(r) = ϵ. We
consider two cases. If the final state of r is a state ofM , then sinceM is input-total, we may extend r by a sequence of High
input and High output transitions to produce a run r ′ with the property that low(r ′) = β and highinput(r ′) = α, as required
for F 2al(M) ∈ NDIl. Otherwise, since high(r) = ϵ, we may write r = r1at , where a ∈ LI and r1 ends in a state of M . In this
case, we first extend r1 by a sequence of High input and High output transitions based on the inputs α, and ending at a state
in M after the final High output, and then take one further step by input a. This again produces a run r ′ with low(r ′) = β
and highinput(r ′) = α, as required. 
Together, these results establish the following, similar to Corollary 5.12 (except that NDCITl is excluded since F 2al(M) is
not input-total).
Corollary 5.15. For M ∈ Mna, we have F 2al(M) ∈ NDIl iff F 2al(M) ∈ NDCl iff F 2al(M) ∈ NDC(IT )l.
These results show that under either representation of action-observed systems, there is significant flexibility in the range
of quantification of the composed processes in the definition of nondeducibility on composition. In the action-observed
representation, the notion NDSa quantifies over deterministic strategies, i.e. strategies in which the H action is a function
of H ’s view of the system. In the two LTS representations, the quantification over strategies corresponds to a quantification
over H processes, but there is no such determinism requirement. Still, the definitions correspond, and we may moreover
choose to quantify over input-total or arbitrary H processes, without changing the satisfaction of the security property in
this class of systems.7
7 Note that it is not hard to show that replacing deterministic strategies by nondeterministic strategies does not increase H ’s power to restrict L’s possible
views. For every nondeterministic H strategy, there always exists a deterministic H-strategy that is consistent with fewer L views. Therefore if an L view is
consistent with all deterministic H strategies it will be consistent with all nondeterministic H strategies as well.
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5.3. Restrictiveness
We now turn to McCullough’s notion of ‘restrictiveness’, already mentioned above. There are two versions of
‘restrictiveness’ introduced in McCullough’s early works. The former [11] is a trace based definition, while the latter is
defined on labelled transition systems [12,13]. In [13] McCullough mentions both definitions and concludes that the one
on labelled transition systems is a stronger notion. The cleanest presentation of the LTS version occurs in [13]. Here we
present this definition in the pattern used for unwinding properties for the automaton models above.
Definition 5.16. Define aMcCullough unwinding relation for an LTSM without τ transitions to be an equivalence relation∼
on the states ofM such that
• M1: for all states s, s′, t and input sequences α and α′ such that α|LI = α′|LI , s α−→ s′ and s ∼ t , there exists a state t ′
such that s′ ∼ t ′ and t α′−→ t ′;
• M2: for all states s, s′, t and output sequencesα such that s α−→ s′ and s ∼ t , there exists a state t ′ and an output sequence
α′ such that α|LO = α′|LO, t α′−→ t ′, and s′ ∼ t ′.
Using this notion, we may state McCullough’s definition of restrictiveness in [13] as follows.
Definition 5.17. An LTSM is restrictive (M ∈ RESl) if it is input-total, it has no τ transitions, and there exists a McCullough
unwinding relation forM .
We may note that in fact part of the assumption of input-totality follows from the rest of this definition, since the
existence of a McCullough unwinding implies input-totality with respect to High inputs. (To see this at state s take α = ϵ
and α′ = h for a High action h, and apply M1 with s′ = t = s.)
The assumption of input-totality is oftenmade in the literature, on the intuitive grounds that it ensures that enabledness
of inputs cannot be a cause of information flow. On the other hand, input-totality might be argued to be too strong a
condition. In particular, note that our translation F 2al produces systems that are necessarily not input-total, since inputs are not
enabled at states of the form (s, a). This means that no system F 2al(M)will be classified as secure according to the definition
RESl, which is undesirable.
In fact, there is a second reason why no system in the range of F 2al can satisfy RESl. Let s be a state in F
2
al(M) for some
action-observed system M with action a ∈ AH enabled. Then, by the translation, any action b ∈ AL must be enabled on s
as well. If F 2al(M) is in RESl, then there is a McCullough unwinding relation ∼ on F 2al(M), which must satisfy s ∼ (s, a) (to
see this, take α = a and α′ = ϵ in M1). However, while b is enabled on s, it is not enabled on (s, a), so we cannot satisfy
condition M1.
Themost reasonable response to this observation depends on one’s intuitions concerning outputs. On the one hand, in the
process algebraic literature, a common understanding is that the agent observing an output plays an active (e.g., handshake)
role in its occurrence. From a security perspective, this means that a receiver can transmit information to a sender, simply
by refusing to participate in the handshake. On this view, the above definition of restrictiveness may be reasonable.
On the other hand, it is also sensible to understand outputs/observations as events that ‘‘happen to’’, or ‘‘are available
to’’ agents, but which they are powerless to prevent. This is implicitly the view taken in our automaton based models, and
it has also been taken in the process algebraic literature: e.g., the signal events of [20] are intended to capture this intuition.
On this view, it is too strong a condition to ask that the Low input b be enabled both at s and (s, a) in F 2al(M) (for a a High
input), since High cannot block the reception of its output from the state (s, a), after which the system reaches a state where
b is in fact enabled. We are therefore motivated to formulate a novel revised version of unwinding and restrictiveness that
is compatible with this latter perspective.
Definition 5.18. A weak McCullough unwinding relation is an equivalence relation∼, such that
• W1: for all a ∈ HI , s a−→ t implies s ∼ t ,
• W2: for all a ∈ HO, s ∼ t and s a−→ s′, there exists α ∈ HO∗ and t ′ ∈ S such that t α−→ t ′ and s′ ∼ t ′,
• W3: for all a ∈ L, s ∼ t and s a−→ s′, then there exists α, β ∈ HO∗ and t ′ ∈ S, such that s′ ∼ t ′, and t α·a·β−→ t ′.
Intuitively, W1 says that High inputs do not affect Low, W2 allows that Low may be aware that High is receiving some
outputs (it could evenbe aware of exactlywhat these outputs are), andW3 says that Low is aware of its ownevents. However,
note that in W3, we do not require that Low events can be directly traced, but only modulo the occurrence of the HO events
that H is powerless to block. The relationship between this definition and the previous one is expressed in the following
result, whose proof is straightforward.
Lemma 5.19. A McCullough unwinding relation is also a weak McCullough unwinding relation.
Note that the converse is not true even for input-total systems. To understand this, consider the following system,
depicted in Fig. 7. Let S = {s, t, r}, LI = {l}, LO = {o, o′}, HI = ∅ and HO = {oH}. The transition relation is defined as
• s l−→ s, s l−→ r , t l−→ t and r l−→ r
• s o−→ s, t o−→ t and r o′−→ r ,
• s oH−→ t and t oH−→ s.
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Fig. 7. An example to show the difference between McCullough and weak McCullough unwinding relations.
There exists a weakMcCullough unwinding on this system, viz. the smallest equivalence relation∼ such that s ∼ t . (This
satisfies W1 trivially because HI = ∅. For W2, we need only consider two cases: (1) s ∼ t and s oH−→ t and (2) t ∼ s and
t
oH−→ s. In case (1) we take α = oH and have t oH−→ s and t ∼ s, as required. Case (2) is symmetric. For W3, suppose that
a ∈ L and we have states x ∼ y and a transition x a−→ x′. If x′ = x then we may take y′ = y and we will have that y a−→ y′
and x′ ∼ y′ for all possible values of x and y. If x′ ≠ x then we must have x = s and x′ = r , so y = s or y = t . If y = swe take
α = β = ϵ, and if y = t we take αoH and β = ϵ, and obtain in either case that y α·a·β−→ r and x′ = r ∼ r , as required for W3.)
On the other hand, the relation∼ is not a McCullough unwinding relation. If it were, taking α = α′ = l and considering
s ∼ t and s l−→ r , by M1 we would need to have r ∼ t , since t α′−→ t ′ implies t ′ = t . But r ∼ t does not hold.
Based on the notion of weak McCullough unwinding (and dropping the assumption of input-totality), we obtain the
following notion of security.
Definition 5.20. An LTSM is weakly restrictive (M ∈ RESwl ) if it has a weak McCullough unwinding relation.
This definition has an appropriate relationship to nondeducibility based definitions such as NDIl and NDSl, even on
systems that are not input-total, in that the following holds:
Lemma 5.21. If M ∈ RESwl then for all traces α of M there exists a trace β with viewL(α) = viewL(β) and highinput(β) = ϵ.
Note also that by Lemma 5.19, we have the following:
Corollary 5.22. If M ∈ RESl then M ∈ RESwl .
We remark that Focardi and Gorrieri [2] have also proposed a definition of restrictiveness in the context of all SPA
processes. Like the definition of RESl above, they also require input-totality. In addition to dealing with τ transitions, their
definition requires that a distinction be made between high and low level τ transitions, for reasons that are not made clear.
Since our translations do not produce LTSs with τ transitions, we will not attempt to treat this extension here; without
it, their definition amounts to RESl as we have defined it. It is worth remarking that Focardi and Gorrieri classify their
definition of restrictiveness with the other trace based properties they consider. We point out that a better comparison
is with the separate hierarchy of bisimulation based definitions of security they define. The following is one of the notions in
this hierarchy.
Definition 5.23. M ∈ LIO satisfies strong bisimulation nondeducibility on compositions (SBNDC) if for every p ∈ P reachable
from p0, if p
h−→ p′ for some h ∈ H then p||H0 ≈B p′||H0.
Here,≈B is the weak bisimulation, and ‘‘0’’ is the deadlock process, with the usual definitions in CCS [15].
We may show the following result, that establishes a correspondence between notions of restrictiveness on action-
observed systems and labelled transition systems under the translation F 1al. We note that this result justifies the use of
the term restrictiveness in Definition 3.9.
Theorem 5.24. (1) M ∈ RESa iff F 1al(M) ∈ RESl iff F 1al(M) ∈ RESwl iff F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC.
(2) M ∈ RESa iff F 2al(M) ∈ RESwl .
This result (together with Theorem 4.3) shows that on the state based models, the (usually quite complicated) definition
of ‘‘restrictiveness’’ has a rather intuitive formulation with a very clear relationship to the classical unwinding theory for
noninterference on deterministic state based systems. Moreover, this notion corresponds exactly with SBNDC under one of
our translations.
To prove Theorem 5.24, we first establish a number of lemmas. We first note that although, in general, restrictiveness is
stronger than weak restrictiveness, we can identify situations where the two notions coincide. In particular, the following
result shows that this is the case for High input-total systems in which observation transitions do not change the state; note
that this condition applies to the LTSs generated by our translation F 1al.
4140 R. van der Meyden, C. Zhang / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 4123–4147
Lemma 5.25. Suppose M ∈ L satisfies (1) for all states s, t and output events o, s o−→ t implies s = t, and (2) s a−→ for all
states s and H inputs a. Then M ∈ RESl iff M ∈ RESwl .
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Next, weak unwinding can be given a simpler characterisation on the image of the mapping F 2al.
Lemma 5.26. For every action-observed system M, F 2al(M) ∈ RESwl iff there exists an equivalence relation ≈ on the states of
F 2al(M) such that
• W1′: for all a ∈ H, s a−→ t implies s ≈ t,
• W2′: for all a ∈ L, if s ≈ t and s a−→ s′, then there exists α ∈ HO∗ and a state t ′ such that s′ ≈ t ′ and t α·a−→ t ′.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 5.24.
Proof (Theorem 5.24). For (1), F 1al(M) ∈ RESl implies F 1al(M) ∈ RESwl is direct from Lemma 5.19. It therefore suffices to show
that (A) M ∈ RESa implies F 1al(M) ∈ RESl, that (B) F 1al(M) ∈ RESwl implies F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC , and that (C) F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC
impliesM ∈ RESa. LetM = ⟨S, s0, next, dom, A⟩ and F 1al(M) = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩.
(A) For the argument from M ∈ RESa to F 1al(M) ∈ RESl, suppose M ∈ RESa. Then there exists an unwinding relation
∼⊆ S × S. First, F 1al(M) is input-total. Define ≈⊆ P × P by (s, f ) ≈ (s′, f ′) if s ∼ t and f (L) = f ′(L). We show that ≈ is a
McCullough unwinding relation.
(1) If (s, f ) ≈ (s′, f ′) and for any α, α′ ∈ I∗ with α|L = α′|L, (s, f ) α−→ (t, g) it can be easily shown by induction on α and
α′ by the properties LRa and SCa of the unwinding relation∼, that there exists (t ′, g ′) such that (s′, f ′) α
′−→ (t ′, g ′) and
(t, g) ≈ (t ′, g ′).
(2) The output condition is trivial because all output transitions in F 1al(M) are self-transitions.
(B) To show that F 1al(M) ∈ RESwl implies F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC , suppose F 1al(M) in RESwl . Then there exists a weak McCullough
unwinding relation ∼ on the states of F 1al(M). Given a reachable state p and p a−→ p′ for a ∈ AH , we need to show that
p||H0 ≈B p′||H0. If a ∈ HO then p = p′, and the claim trivially holds. If a ∈ HI then we have p ∼ p′. We need to show the
relation≈ defined by p||H0 ≈ p′||H0 if p ∼ p′ is a weak bisimulation. Since there are no τ transitions, we only need to check
the case when p||H0 b−→ q||H0 for some b ∈ AL. By definition of weak McCullough unwinding there exists p′ α·b·β−→ q′ and
q ∼ q′ for some α, β ∈ HO∗. However in F 1al(M) all outputs only produce self-transitions, thus we have p′ b−→ q′ and q ∼ q′.
Therefore we have shown that q||H0 ≈ q′||H0, i.e.,≈ is a weak bisimulation as required. Thus p||H0 ≈B p′||H0. By definition,
F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC .
(C) For the argument from F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC toM ∈ RESa, suppose F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC . We first define∼′⊆ S × S by s ∼′ t
if there exist f , g ∈ OD such that f (L) = g(L), both (s, f ) and (t, g) are reachable, and (s, f )||H0 ≈B (t, g)||H0. This relation
is reflexive and symmetric, but need not be transitive. Define ∼ as the transitive closure of ∼′. Then ∼ is an equivalence
relation. We show that∼ is an unwinding relation onM .
LRa: Suppose s, t ∈ S, a ∈ AH and (o, t) ∈ step(s, a). Let f ∈ OD be such that (s, f ) is reachable in F 1al(M). From
Definition 5.2, (s, f )
a−→ (t, f [H → o]), and since F 1al(M) ∈ SBNDC , we have (s, f )||H0 ≈B (t, f [H → o])||H0.Moreover,
f (L) = f [H → o](L), so we have s ∼′ t , hence s ∼ t .
SCa: Suppose s ∼ t , a ∈ AL and (o, s′) ∈ step(s, a). We need to show that there exists a state t ′ such that (o, t ′) ∈ step(t, a)
and s′ ∼ t ′. Since s ∼ t , there exists some n ∈ N+ such that s(∼′)nt . We proceed by induction on n, showing that if
s(∼′)nt , a ∈ AL and (o, s′) ∈ step(s, a), then there exists a state t ′ such that (o, t ′) ∈ step(t, a) and s′(∼′)nt ′. The base
case of n = 0 is trivial. Suppose that s(∼′)nu ∼′ t , a ∈ AL and (o, s′) ∈ step(s, a). By the induction hypothesis, there
exists a state u′ such that (o, u′) ∈ step(u, a) and s′(∼′)nu′. Since u ∼′ t , there exist f , g ∈ OD such that (u, f ) and (t, g)
are reachable, f (L) = g(L) and (u, f )||H0 ≈B (t, g)||H0. By the construction of F 1al(M), we have (u, f ) a−→ (u′, f [L → o]).
Thus, there exists a transition (t, g)
a−→ (t ′, g ′) such that (u′, f [L → o])||H0 ≈B (t ′, g ′)||H0. But there exists a transition
labelled o from (u′, f [L → o]), so there must also exist a transition labelled o from (t ′, g ′). The construction of F 1al(M)
implies that g ′(L) = o = f [L → o](L). This shows that u′ ∼′ t ′. Since, also by construction of F 1al(M), we have
(o, t ′) ∈ next(t, a), this gives the required transition and relation inM to complete the proof.
For (2), let F 2al(M) = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩ with P = S ∪ (S × A), p0 = s0, L = I ∪ O and→= {(s, a, (s, a)) | s ∈ S, a ∈
A} ∪ {((s, a), o, t) | (o, t) ∈ next(s, a)}. We show thatM ∈ RESa implies F 2al(M) ∈ RESwl . Let∼ be an unwinding relation on
M . Define a symmetric relation≈0⊆ P , by the following:
(1) For s, t ∈ S, if s ∼ t inM then s ≈0 t .
(2) For s, t ∈ S, a ∈ HI and o ∈ HO, if s a−→ (s, a) o−→ t , then s ≈0 (s, a) and (s, a) ≈0 t .
(3) For s, t ∈ S and a ∈ LI , if s ∼ t then (s, a) ≈0 (t, a).
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Define ≈ as the reflexive, transitive closure of ≈0. Then ≈ is an equivalence relation. We prove that ≈ satisfies conditions
W1′ and W2′ in Lemma 5.26. The proof of W1′ is trivial from rule (2). For W2′, we first show that the relation ≈0 satisfies
the following:
(*) If u1 ≈0 u2 and u1 α·e−→ u′1 for α ∈ HO∗ and e ∈ L then there exists α′ ∈ HO∗ and a state u′2 such that u2 α
′·e−→ u′2
and u′1 ≈0 u′2.
The proof of W2′ is then straightforward. Suppose a ∈ L, u ≈ v and u a−→ u′. Then there exist u0, u1, . . . , un ∈ P such that
ui−1 ≈0 ui for all i = 1 . . . n, u = u0 and v = un. By induction using (*), we obtain a sequence of states u′ = u′0, . . . , u′n and
sequences α1, . . . , αn ∈ HO∗ such that ui αi·a−→ u′i and u′i−1 ≈0 u′i . It follows by transitivity that u′ ≈ u′n and v αn·a−→ u′n, as
required for W2′.
For the proof of (*), suppose that u1 ≈0 u2 and u1 α·e−→ u′1 for α ∈ HO∗ and e ∈ L. We have the following cases:
• If u1 ≈0 u2 by rule 1, then u1, u2 ∈ S and u1 ∼ u2. By construction of F 2al(M), the only possibilities for the transition
u1
α·e−→ u′1 are e ∈ LI , α = ϵ and u′1 = (u1, e). Since then u2 ϵ·e−→ (u2, e), and (u1, e) ≈0 (u2, e) by rule 3, we may take
α′ = ϵ and u′2 = (u2, e).• If u1 ≈0 u2 by rule 2, then we have the following cases.
· Suppose u1 = s and u2 = (s, b) for some s ∈ S and b ∈ HI , then the only possibility for u1 α·e−→ u′1 is s ϵ·a−→ (s, a)with
e = a ∈ LI . Let (o, t) ∈ next(s, b) for some o ∈ HO, then s ∼ t inM by LRa. Therefore t a−→ (t, a) and (s, a) ≈0 (t, a)
by rule 3. Combining the previousH output we have u2 = (s, b) o·a−→ (t, a) and (s, a) ≈0 (t, a), so wemay take α′ = o
and u′2 = (t, a).
· The reverse of the previous case: u1 = (s, b) and u2 = s for some b ∈ HI . Here the only possibility for u1 α·e−→ u′1 is
(s, b)
o−→ t a−→ (t, a) for some t ∈ S, α = o ∈ HO and e = a ∈ LI . Therefore in M we have (o, t) ∈ next(s, b), and
s ∼ t by LRa. So we have s ϵ·a−→ (s, a) and (t, a) ≈0 (s, a) by rule 3. Here we may take α′ = ϵ and u′2 = (s, a).
· Suppose u1 = (s, b) and u2 = t with (s, b) o−→ t for b ∈ HI and o ∈ HO. Then the only possibility for u1 α·e−→ u′1 is
(s, b)
o−→ t a−→ (t, a) with α = o and e = a ∈ LI . Since t ∼ t in M , we have t ϵ·a−→ (t, a) and (t, a) ≈0 (t, a) by
rule 3, so we may take α′ = ϵ and u′2 = (t, a).
· The reverse of the previous case: u1 = t , u2 = (s, b) and (s, b) o−→ t for b ∈ HI and o ∈ HO. Now the possibility for
u1
α·e−→ u′1 is t ϵ·a−→ (t, a)with α = ϵ and e = a ∈ LI . Then (s, b) o·a−→ (t, a) and (t, a) ≈0 (t, a) by rule 3, so we may
take α′ = o and u′2 = (t, a).
• If u1 ≈0 u2 by rule 3, then u1 and u2 are in the form of (s, a) and (t, a), respectively, with s ∼ t and a ∈ LI . Then the only
possibility for u1
α·e−→ u′1 is that u1 = (s, a) ϵ·o−→ s′ = u′1 with e = o ∈ LO, so (o, s′) ∈ next(s, a). By s ∼ t and SCa, there
exists (o, t ′) ∈ next(t, a) such that s′ ∼ t ′. Therefore s′ ≈0 t ′ by rule 1 and u2 = (t, a) ϵ·o−→ t ′. Thus, we may take α′ = ϵ
and u′2 = t ′.
This completes the proof of (*). 
Next we show that F 2al(M) ∈ RESwl implies M ∈ RESa. Suppose that there is a relation ≈ on F 2al(M) as defined in
Lemma 5.26. We define s ∼ t inM if s ≈ t in F 2al(M). Then obviously∼ is an equivalence relation since≈ is an equivalence
relation. To show that∼ is an unwinding relation, we argue as follows:
• LRa: for all a ∈ AH and (o, t) ∈ next(s, a), we have s a−→ (s, a) o−→ t in F 2al(M), so s ≈ t by W1′ and transitivity, which
implies s ∼ t .
• SCa: if s ∼ t , a ∈ AL and (o, s′) ∈ next(s, a) then s ≈ t and we have s a−→ (s, a) o−→ s′ in F 2al(M). By W2′, there exists
α′ ∈ HO∗ and a state u such that t α′·a−→ u and (s, a) ≈ u. Since no actions in HO are enabled on t the only possibility
for t
α′·a−→ u is α′ = ϵ and t ϵ·a−→ (t, a), so we have (s, a) ≈ (t, a). By a similar argument using W2′ from (s, a) ≈ (t, a)
and (s, a)
o−→ s′, we conclude that there exists a state t ′ ∈ S such that (t, a) o−→ t ′ and s′ ≈ t ′, hence s′ ≈ t ′. By the
definition of F 2al, we have (o, t
′) ∈ next(t, a) and s′ ∼ t ′ . 
We note that the function F 2al does not make F
2
al(M) ∈ RESwl coincide F 2al(M) ∈ SBNDC in that every H input must be
followed by an H output in the translated system, while SBNDC requires that s
a−→ t implies s ≈B t for all reachable s and
a ∈ H , thus it does not distinguish inputs and outputs from H .
It is also worth noting that we relate the RES properties to SBNDC but not BNDC . This is because in some cases BNDC does
not guarantee deducibility based security. The following process Q ,
Q = τ .l1.Q + l2.l2.Q + h1.l1.Q
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a variant of one discussed in Forster’s thesis [4], can be verified to satisfy SBSSNI and BNDC , but L’s observation of (a single) l2
is incompatible with H ’s action h1. Therefore, in general, BNDC is incomparable with deducibility based security properties
such as NDIl.
5.4. BNS
For completeness, we also characterise the notion BNS, [1] discussed above, within LTS. The intuition for BNS is that Low’s
future pattern of observations depends only on the current Low state, which, in the context of action-observed system, we
took to be Low’s most recent observation.
We found in the previous section that restrictiveness on action-observed systems corresponds to two different notions
of security on labelled transition systems, depending onwhether we translate from action-observed systems using F 1al or F
2
al,
since these translations construct labelled transition systems with somewhat different intuitive interpretations. A similar
point applies to the notion BNS. In order to formulate BNS on labelled transition systems, we need to make sense of the
notion of ‘‘most recent observation’’ of an agent, so that we may define BNS by stating (using a notion of unwinding) that
Low’s new observation on performing an action depends only on itsmost recent observation and the action being performed
(the dependency on the later is implicit in the definitions above).
In the case of F 1al, we have the difficulty that the translation constructs LTSs that generate some runs in which an agent
performs a sequence of actions but never makes an observation. However, the missing observations in such runs were
enabled as self-loops from the states generated during the execution. The appropriate intuitive viewpoint to take to this
would seem to be that an agent is able to observe the set of outputs enabled at a state. (This makes the most intuitive sense
when output transitions are self-transitions. It is also quite reasonable if different observations represent, e.g., the values of
variables that an agent may read.)
For a state p of an LTS ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩, define obsL(p) to be the set of o ∈ LO such that there exists p′ ∈ P with p o−→ p′.
Using this definition we obtain the following definition of BNS in labelled transition systems.
Definition 5.27. An LTS M is in BNSl if the relation ∼L, defined on M by p ∼L q if obsL(p) = obsL(q), is a McCullough
unwinding.
The intuition for the relation∼L on LTSs (equivalence of the set of possible observations) is somewhat different from that
used in the definition of BNSa (equivalence of the most recent L observation). However, in F 1al(M), the (unique) next possible
observation is in fact that which would have been obtained from the most recent L action. Thus, it is not surprising to find
the following equivalence.
Theorem 5.28. If M ∈ Mna then M ∈ BNSa iff F 1al(M) ∈ BNSl.
Proof. Let M = ⟨S, s0, next, dom, A⟩, F 1al(M) = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩, and UF(M) = ⟨S ′, (s0, f0), next ′, dom, A⟩. First, note
that UF(M) and F 1al(M) have the same set of states. Moreover, we have (s, f ) ∼L (t, g) (in UF(M)), iff f (L) = g(L) iff
obsL((s, f )) = {f (L)} = {g(L)} = obsL((s, f )) iff (s, f ) ∼L (t, g) (in F 1al(M)). Thus also the equivalence relations in question
are identical and we need to show that∼L is an unwinding relation on UF(M) iff∼L is a McCullough unwinding on F 1al(M).
We prove that∼L is an unwinding relation on UF(M) if∼L is a McCullough unwinding on F 1al(M).
LRa For all (o, (t, g)) ∈ next ′((s, f ), a)with a ∈ AH , g = f [H → o], so g(L) = f (L)which implies (s, f ) ∼L (t, g).
SCa For all (s, f ), (t, g) ∈ S ′ with (s, f ) ∼ (t, g) and (o, (s′, f ′)) ∈ next ′((s, f ), a) with a ∈ AL, by definition, f ′(L) = o, and
on M , (o, s′) ∈ next(s, a). Thus, (s, f ) a−→ (s′, f ′) in F 1al(M). Since ∼L is a McCullough unwinding relation, and a ∈ LI ,
there exists a transition (t, g)
a−→ (t ′, g ′) with (s′, f ′) ∼L (t ′, g ′). Thus g ′(L) = f ′(L) = o. This means that there exists
a transition (o, t ′) ∈ next(t, a) inM , hence (o, (t ′, g ′)) ∈ next((t, g), a) in UF(M).
From∼L being an unwinding relation to∼L being a McCullough unwinding can be proved by first doing an induction on the
length on any input sequence α, α′ ∈ (LI ∪HI)∗ with α|LI = α′|LI . The output case is trivial and similar to what was shown
in the proof of Theorem 5.24. 
In case of the systems produced by F 2al, we do not have the problem that outputs are optional, so we canmake sense of the
notion of ‘‘most recent observation’’ straightforwardly as ‘‘the label of the output transition most recently taken’’. However,
this translation produces two different types of states: those of the form of states s of the system being translated (where no
outputs are enabled) and those of the form (s, a) (where only a single output is enabled). Since their behaviour with respect
to Low outputs differs, we cannot treat these two types of states as equivalent under an unwinding. In order to define a
reasonable notion of BNS on such systems, we therefore take the view that an agent is aware of its most recent observation,
as well as any actions it has taken since that observation (allowing multiple such actions makes the definition applicable to
a more general set of LTSs than those produced by F 2al).
To formalise these ideas, we use the following notion of unfolding, which produces a version of an LTS in which states
record the most recent observation and any subsequent actions. ForM = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩ an LTS with inputs I and outputs O,
let the unfolding ofM be
UFl(M) = ⟨P × (OI∗ ∪ I∗)D, (p0, f0),→,L⟩
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restricted to the set of reachable states, where f0 is the function satisfying f0(u) = ϵ for all u ∈ D. The transition relation is
defined as (s, f )
a−→ (t, g) if s a−→ t inM , and
• if a ∈ I , then g = f [dom(a) → f (dom(a)) · a],
• if a ∈ O, then g = f [dom(a) → (a)].
Intuitively, the function f records each agent’s information about the most recent observation and any subsequent actions.
On taking an action we append this action to the agent’s record; on an observation we update the record to consist of just
that observation.
Using this notion of unfolding, we may now state a definition of BNS on LTSs that is appropriate to the LTSs produced by
the transformation F 2al. As discussed above in the context of restrictiveness, the notion of unwinding that is most appropriate
to such systems is weak McCullough unwinding. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 5.29. M ∈ L is inBNSwl if the relation∼ onUFl(M), defined by (u, f ) ∼ (v, g) if f (L) = g(L), is aweakMcCullough
unwinding relation.
This notion corresponds to BNSa in the desired way:
Theorem 5.30. M ∈ BNSa iff F 2al(M) ∈ BNSwl .
In the proof of this result, we need to establish the relationship between two systems connected by F 2al when they are
both unfolded (though in two different ways). Given M = ⟨S, s0, next, A, dom⟩ ∈ Mna and F 2al(M) = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩, define
the following equivalence relations
• ∼ on the states S × (O ∪ {ϵ0})D of UF(M) by (s, f ) ∼ (t, g) if f (L) = g(L), and
• ∼′ on the states P × (OA∗ ∪ A∗)D of UFl(F 2al(M)) by (s, f ′) ∼ (t, g ′) if f ′(L) = g ′(L).
We have the following observation.
Lemma 5.31. For all s, t ∈ S, there exist reachable states (s, f ) and (t, g) in UF(M) such that (s, f ) ∼ (t, g) iff there exists
reachable states (s, f ′) and (t, g ′) in UF L(F 2al(M)) such that (s, f ′) ∼′ (t, g ′).
Proof. For the ‘only if’, if (s, f ) is reachable in UF(M) then there is a run (s0, f0)(a1, o1)(s1, f1) . . . (an, on)(sn, fn) with
(s, f ) = (sn, fn). Then by the definition of UF L and F 2al, there is a run
(s0, f ′0) a1 ((s0, a1), f
′′
1 ) o1 (s1, f
′
1) . . . ((sn−1, an), f
′′
n ) on (sn, f
′
n)
of UF L(F 2al(M)) with s = sn. If there exists a rightmost L action ai in this run, then f ′n(L) = oi = fn(L). Otherwise f ′n(L) = ϵ
and fn(L) = ϵ0. We let f ′ be f ′n . Similarly by tracing a run reaching (t, g) in UF(M), we construct another run in UF L(F 2al(M))
reaching (t, g ′)with either g ′(L) = oi = g(L) = f (L) or g(L) = ϵ0 = f (L) and g ′(L) = ϵ. Therefore we have the existence of
f ′ and g ′ with f ′(L) = g ′(L), so (s, f ′) ∼′ (t, g ′). The proof for the ‘if’ part is similar. 
We can now give the proof of Theorem 5.30:
Proof. Let M = ⟨S, s0, next, A, dom⟩, and F 2al(M) = ⟨P, p0,→,L⟩ with P = S ∪ (S × A). Note that in the LTSs F 2al(M) and
UFl(F 2al(M))we consider, we have LI = AL and HI = AH .
For the ‘only if’ part, suppose M ∈ BNSa. We show that on UFl(F 2al(M)) the relation ∼′, defined by (u, f ) ∼′ (v, g) if
f (L) = g(L), is a weak McCullough unwinding relation.
W1. If (u, f )
a−→ (u′, f ′)with a ∈ HI , then f ′ = f [H → f (H) · a], and f ′(L) = f (L), therefore (u, f ) ∼′ (u′, f ′).
W2. Suppose (u, f )
a−→ (u′, f ′)with a ∈ HO, and (u, f ) ∼′ (v, g). Then f ′ = f [H → a], and therefore f ′(L) = f (L) = g(L).
We satisfy the requirements of W2 using (v, g)
ϵ−→ (v, g) and (u′, f ′) ∼′ (v, g).
W3. Suppose (u, f )
a−→ (u′, f ′)with a ∈ L, and (u, f ) ∼′ (v, g). We need to show that there exists (v, g) α·a·α′−→ (v′, g ′)with
α, α′ ∈ HO∗ and (u′, f ′) ∼′ (v′, g ′). We consider first the case where a ∈ LI . Then u ∈ S by definition of the function
F 2al. There are two cases as follows.
· If v ∈ S, then by (u, f ) ∼′ (v, g) we have f (L) = g(L). Since a is enabled on v we have (v, g) a−→ (v′, g ′) and
g ′ = g[L → g(L) · a]. It is obvious that f ′(L) = f (L) · a = g(L) · a = g ′(L). In this case we let α = α′ = ϵ.
· If v ∈ S × A, then let it be (t, b). We must have b ∈ HI , because by definition of F 2al, f (L) is in LO ∪ {ϵ}; if we
had b ∈ LI then g(L) = o′ · b with o′ ∈ LO, which implies f (L) ≠ g(L), a contradiction. Since b ∈ HI , we have
((t, b), g)
o′′−→ (r, g ′′) with o′′ ∈ HO and r ∈ S. It is not hard to see that g ′′(L) = g(L) = f (L). Since every action is
enabled on r , there exists (r, g ′′) a−→ ((r, a), g ′), and it follows g ′(L) = g ′′(L) · a = f (L) · a = f ′(L). In this case we
let α = o′′ and α′ = ϵ.
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Alternately, suppose that a ∈ LO. Then u ∈ S × A by the definition of the function F 2al, so u is in the form of (s, b)
with s ∈ S and b ∈ LI . By the definition of UFl and F 2al, we have f (L) in the form of o · b for some o ∈ LO, therefore
g(L) = f (L) = o·b and vmust be in the form (t, b) since otherwise f (L) ≠ g(L).Moreover there exist f ′′ and g ′′ such that
(s, f ′′) ∼′ (t, g ′′)with f ′′(L) = g ′′(L) = o. By Lemma 5.31 there exists h1, h2 ∈ (O∪{ϵ0})D such that (s, h1) ∼ (t, h2) on
UF(M). Then in UF(M) we have (a, (u′, h′1)) ∈ next((s, h1), b), and by BNSa there exists (a, (v′, h′2)) ∈ next((t, h2), b)
with h′1(L) = h′2(L) = a. So (a, v′) ∈ next(t, b) inM , hence (t, b) a−→ v′ in F 2al(M). Therefore, in UF L(F 2al(M)) we have
(v, g) = ((t, b), g) a−→ (v′, g ′) and g ′(L) = a = f ′(L). Consequently, (u′, f ′) ∼′ (v′, g ′), andwe have the requirements
of W3 with α = α′ = ϵ.
For the ‘if’, suppose UFl(F 2al(M)) is in BNS
w
l , we show that the relation∼ defined by (s, f ) ∼ (t, g) if f (L) = g(L) on UF(M)
is an unwinding relation.
• For LRa, if a ∈ AH , it follows from the definition of UF that for all (o, (t, g)) ∈ next((s, f ), a) we have f (L) = g(L), hence
(s, f ) ∼ (t, g).
• For SCa, suppose a ∈ AL and (s, f ) ∼ (t, g) and (o, (s′, f ′)) ∈ next((s, f ), a). By Lemma 5.31, there exists reachable
states (s, h1) and (t, h2) of UFl(Fal(M)) such that (s, h1) ∼′ (t, h2). Moreover, by the construction of UFl(F 2al(M)), there
exist transitions (s, h1)
a−→ ((s, a), h′1) o−→ (s′, h′′1). Since ∼′ is a weak McCullough unwinding relation, there exist
α1, α2, α3, α4 ∈ HO∗ such that (t, h2) α1·a·α2−→ ((t, a), h′2)
α3·o·α4−→ (t ′, h′′2) and (s′, h′′1) ∼′ (t ′, h′′2), and obviously by the
definition of F 2al we have α1 = α2 = α3 = α4 = ϵ. This gives us (o, (t ′, g ′)) ∈ next((t, g), a) with g ′(L) = o = f ′(L). So
(s′, f ′) ∼ (t ′, g ′). 
In the case of restrictiveness, we found that the two different notions RESl ⊆ RESwl that correspond to RESa under the
mappings F 1al and F
2
al, respectively, are identical on the range of F
1
al.
While we similarly have that BNSa corresponds to BNSl and BNSwl under F
1
al and F
2
al, respectively, we note that it can be
shown that we have neither BNSl ⊆ BNSwl , nor are these notions identical on the range of either F 1al and F 2al. However, such
a relationship is not necessarily desirable. The intuition for BNS is that it states that, with respect to L, future behaviour is
determined by L’s current observation. However, the definitions BNSl and BNSwl are motivated by quite different intuitive
interpretations of how the notion of ‘‘current observation’’ is encoded in a labelled transition system.
6. Conclusion
We have studied the relationships between a variety of definitions of noninterference under a number of mappings be-
tween different semantic frameworks. The results of the paper are summarised in Fig. 8, which depicts the semantic frame-
works we have considered, the mappings between them, and how these mappings relate various definitions of security.
In particular, the diagram indicates when notions of security in different semantic frameworks correspond under seman-
tic mappings between these frameworks. Also depicted are several cases where what are generally distinct definitions of
security collapse when restricted to the range of these mappings. For the practitioner whose model fits within either the
state- or action-observed automaton framework, these collapses provide assurance that classical definitions such as nond-
educibility, restrictiveness and behavioural nondeterministic security remain of relevance and do not miss issues that have
been the topic of the process algebraic studies. Rather, the distinctions between the many new process algebraic definitions
arise from subtleties that appear only in the context of the richer expressiveness of the process algebraic semantics.
While there have been a number of extensive comparative studies of definitions of noninterference within semantic
frameworks [24,3], work on the comparison of different frameworks has been more limited. Focardi et al. [5], connects
language based security with a particular process algebraic property by a one-way translation. Focardi and Gorrieri [3]
discuss a number of connections between CCS based and CSP based security properties on non-divergent processes. The
first connection is that failure semantics, which is the default semantics of CSP (without divergence), is strictly weaker than
bisimulation semantics, so that if the failure based properties (such as FNDC , FSNNI) are defined, they will be strictly weaker
than their corresponding bisimulation based properties (such as BNDC , BSNNI) but strictly stronger than their corresponding
trace based properties (such as NDC , SNNI). Second, they compared Roscoe’s eager and lazy security properties [20], which
are based on low determinism, with the bisimulation based properties on labelled transition systems. It is shown that
bisimulation based properties are strictlyweaker than the lazy security property, but not comparablewith the eager security
property. Connections of the type that we have discussed between unwinding based definitions and bisimulation have
also been noted in the context of CSP approaches to security [21]. Mantel and Sabelfeld studied the relationship between
programming language security and trace based security in [18], in which a time-sensitive bisimulation based security is
connected to a trace based property of [10], by translating a program of a particular language into a state event system.
Another work by Morgan links a state based approach to modelling concurrency to an event based approach (CSP), by
expressing traces, failures and divergences of CSP as weakest precondition formulas over action systems [17], but without
considering security.
We have focused in our work on mappings from state based models, in order to create a bridge from this type of
model (which, for pragmatic reasons, is still the most commonly used approach in applied work on formal verification
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Fig. 8. Relationships between properties under transformations.
of information flow properties in operating systems [27,8,19]) to the more recent literature on security in process algebraic
settings. Our results show that similar properties in different models do often correspond in a precise sense, but highlight
some subtleties. We found that the most direct correspondence between existing notions on the various models is obtained
when the obligatory observations in the state-observed model are treated as optional when mapped to the other models.
However, for another translation, that treats observations as obligatory, we were able to give a new definition of unwinding
that leads to a correspondence of all the notions we consider under this translation.
Also, and of particular interest, given ourmotivation from operating systems verification, the strongest process algebraic
notion, SBNDC , is logically weaker on the automaton models than the notion BNSs which seems closest to the models and
properties used in the operating systems verification literature [8,19]. Even if one considers a logically weaker notion to
capture one’s intuitions for security, there is no harm in proving a stronger property (and there is a benefit if it yields a
simpler proof). Therefore, although BNS has been neglected in the recent theoretical literature, we believe that it remains
of relevance.
Our focus in this paper, followingmuch of the literature, has been on asynchronousmodels and the specific policy L ≤ H .
However, the operating systems literature that originally motivated the study of noninterference also involves issues such
as separation policy, intransitive noninterference, scheduling and synchrony that go beyond the concerns we have treated
in this paper. We intend to address these issues in future work.
Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of some lemmas presented in the article.
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Proof (Theorem 3.7). A proof for the action-observed system can be found in [23]. For state-observed systems, the proof is
similar to [23].
(1) Suppose there exists an unwinding relation ∼L satisfying Output Consistencys, Locally Respects and Step Consistency.
We show that s0◦α ∼L s0◦purgeL(α) for allα ∈ A∗. It follows from this that obsL(s0◦α) = obsL(s0◦purgeL(α)), by Output
Consistencys, soM ∈ NIs. We proceed by induction on length of α. For the base case α = ϵ, we have ϵ = purgeL(ϵ), so
s0 ◦ ϵ ∼L s0 ◦ purgeL(ϵ), since∼L is reflexive. Suppose s0 ◦ α ∼L s0 ◦ purgeL(α) for some α. We show the case for α · a
with a ∈ A.
• If dom(a) = H , then purgeL(α · a) = purgeL(α), and s0 ◦ α ∼L step(s0 ◦ α, a) = s0 ◦ (α · a) by Locally Respects.
Since s0 ◦ α ∼L s0 ◦ purgeL(α) by induction hypothesis, we obtain by the fact that∼L is an equivalence relation that
s0 ◦ (α · a) ∼L s0 ◦ purgeL(α) = s0 ◦ purgeL(α · a).
• If dom(a) = L, then purgeL(α · a) = purgeL(α) · a. Since s0 ◦ α ∼L s0 ◦ purgeL(α) by induction hypothesis, we have
step(s0 ◦α, a) ∼L step(s0 ◦purgeL(α), a) by Step Consistency, i.e., s0 ◦ (α ·a) ∼L s0 ◦ (purge(α) ·a) = s0 ◦purgeL(α ·a).
(2) Suppose that a deterministic state-observed system M is in NIs, i.e., obsL(s0 ◦ α) = obsL(s0 ◦ purgeL(α)) for all α ∈ A∗.
We show that there exists an unwinding relation on M . Similar to [23], let
L∼ be the relation such that s L∼ t if for all
α ∈ A∗, obsL(s ◦ α) = obsL(t ◦ α). We show that L∼ satisfies Output Consistencys, Locally Respects and Step Consistency.
• For Output Consistencys, if s L∼ t we have obsL(s ◦ ϵ) = obsL(t ◦ purgeL(ϵ)), which is just obsL(s) = obsL(t).
• For Locally Respects, suppose there exists s ∈ S and a ∈ AH such that s ̸ L∼ step(s, a). Then there exists α ∈ A∗
such that obsL(s ◦ α) ≠ obsL(s ◦ (a · α)). Since s is reachable there is α′ ∈ A∗ such that s = s0 ◦ α′. Therefore
obsL(s0 ◦ (α′ · a · α)) ≠ obsL(s0 ◦ (α′ · α)). However purgeL(α′ · a · α) = purgeL(α′ · α) by a ∈ AH , so
obsL(s0 ◦ (α′ · a · α)) = obsL(s0 ◦ (α′ · α)) by the system in NIs, which is a contradiction.
• For Step Consistency, suppose there exists s, t ∈ S and a ∈ A such that s L∼ t and step(s, a) ̸ L∼ step(t, a). Then there
exists α ∈ A∗ such that obsL(step(s, a)◦α) ≠ obsL(step(t, a)◦α), i.e., obsL(s◦ (a ·α)) ≠ obsL(t ◦ (a ·α)), contradicting
s
L∼ t . 
Proof (Lemma 3.11). It suffices to show that if M1 ≈ M2 and M1 ∈ RESa then M2 ∈ RESa. Since M1 ∈ RESa, there exists an
unwinding relation∼1 on S1 satisfying SCa and LRa. Define∼2 on S2 by t1 ∼2 t2 if there exists s1, s2 ∈ S1 such that s1 ∼1 s2,
s1 ≈ t1 and s2 ≈ t2. To show that∼2 is reflexive, for every reachable t ∈ S2, we have a run starting from s20 to t . By s10 ≈ s20,
an induction on this run leads us to a state s ∈ S1 with s ≈ t . Then t ∼2 t is by s ∼1 s. ∼2 is both symmetric and transitive
since∼1 is symmetric and transitive. It is straightforward to show that∼2 is an unwinding relation on S2.
• To show SCa, let t1 ∼2 t2 and (o, t ′1) ∈ next2(t1, a) for some a ∈ AL. By definition there exist s1, s2 ∈ S1 such that
s1 ∼1 s2, s1 ≈ t1 and s2 ≈ t2. Then there exists (o, s′1) ∈ next1(s1, a) such that s′1 ≈ t ′1. From s1 ∼1 s2 there exists
(o, s′2) ∈ next1(s2, a) such that s′1 ∼1 s′2. Then from bisimulation there exists (o, t ′2) ∈ next2(t2, a) such that s′2 ≈ t ′2, and
we have all that is required to establish t ′1 ∼2 t ′2.
• To show LRa, for any reachable state t ∈ S2, there exists a sequence of transitions from s20 to t . From s10 ≈ s20, we prove
by induction that there exists a sequence of transitions from s10 to a state s ∈ S1 and s ≈ t . Then for all a ∈ AH with
(o, t ′) ∈ next(t, a), there exists (o, s′) ∈ next(s, a) such that s′ ≈ t ′. From ∼1 satisfying LRa we have s ∼1 s′. This gives
the result t ∼2 t ′ as required. 
Proof (Lemma 5.25). Since aMcCullough unwinding relation is also aweakMcCullough unwinding relation by Lemma 5.19,
we only need to show that if there is a weak McCullough unwinding relation on M then there is an unwinding relation on
M . Let∼ be a weak McCullough unwinding relation. We show that∼ is also a McCullough unwinding relation. Let s ∼ t .
• (M1) For all α, α′ ∈ I∗ satisfying α|L = α′|L and s α−→ s′, let α = α0a0α1a1 . . . an−1αn, and α′ = α′0a0α′1a1 . . . an−1α′n,
where ai ∈ LI for i = 0, . . . , n − 1 and αi, α′i ∈ HI∗ for i = 0, . . . , n. We also assume there are intermediate states
s0, s1 . . . sn such that si
αi·ai−→ si+1 for all i, and s = s0, and sn αn−→ s′. We prove by induction that there exist states
t0, t1 . . . tn such that ti
α′i ·ai−→ ti+1 and si ∼ ti for all i. The base case is trivial. Suppose sk ∼ tk and sk αk−→ s′k
ak−→ sk+1. By
W1, sk ∼ s′k, therefore tk ∼ s′k. Also, for each sequence α′k, by High input-totality, there exists t ′k such that tk
α′k−→ t ′k, and
byW1we have tk ∼ t ′k. Thus s′k ∼ t ′k. From s′k
ak−→ sk+1, byW3, there exist t ′k
γ ·ak·γ ′−→ tk+1 and sk+1 ∼ tk+1 with γ , γ ′ ∈ HO∗.
By the fact that every output transition goes to its source state, we have t ′k
ak−→ tk+1. For the final case which is sn ∼ tn
and sn
αn−→ s′ implies there exist t ′ and α′n ∈ HO∗ such that tn
α′n−→ t ′ and s′ ∼ t ′, this can be shown in a similar way.
• (M2) For all α ∈ O∗, s α−→ s′ implies s = s′. We take α′ = ϵ and t ′ = t , so that t α′−→ t ′ and s′ = s ∼ t = t ′. 
Proof (Lemma 5.26). For the ‘if’ direction it is obvious that ≈ is a weak McCullough unwinding relation. For the ‘only if’,
suppose F 2al(M) ∈ RESwl . Then there is a weak McCullough unwinding relation ∼ on F 2al(M). We show that ∼ satisfies the
conditions on≈. Let S be the set of states ofM .
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(W1′) For a ∈ HI , W1′ is immediate from W1. For o ∈ HO, note that if x o−→ t then x = (s, a) for some a ∈ HI and
s ∈ S and t ∈ S. By W1 and symmetry, (s, a) ∼ s, so by W2 there exist α ∈ HO∗ and a state s′ such that s α−→ s′ and
t ∼ s′. However, no actions in HO are enabled at s, which means that the only possibility is α = ϵ and we get t ∼ s′ = s. So
x = (s, a) ∼ t by the fact that∼ is an equivalence relation.
(W2′) Suppose s ∼ t and s a−→ s′ for a ∈ L. By W3, there exist β, β ′ ∈ HO∗ and a state t ′ such that t β·a·β ′−→ t ′ and s′ ∼ t ′.
We need to find α ∈ HO∗ and a state y such that t α·a−→ y and s′ ∼ y. We consider the cases of a ∈ LI and a ∈ LO separately.
If a ∈ LI , then we must have s ∈ S and s′ = (s, a). We consider two cases, depending on whether t ∈ S.
• If t ∈ S, then actions in HO are enabled neither at t , nor at (t, a). Therefore, we must have β = β ′ = ϵ, and t ′ = (t, a),
so t
a−→ (t, a) = t ′. Here we take α = ϵ and y = t ′ ∼ s′.
• If t is of the form (r, b)with r ∈ S, it is impossible that b ∈ AL because in this case no outputs in HO or inputs in LI would
be enabled at (r, b). Thus b ∈ AH and t = (r, b) o−→ r ′ a−→ (r ′, a) for some r ′ ∈ S and o ∈ HO. Indeed, we must have
β = o and β ′ = ϵ (since no HO event can be enabled at (r ′, a)). Thus, (r ′, a) ∼ s′, and wemay take α = o and y = (r ′, a).
Suppose that a ∈ LO. By W3, there exist β, β ′ ∈ HO∗ such that t β·a·β ′−→ t ′ and s′ ∼ t ′. Since there are no successive output
transitions in F 2al(M), we must have β = β ′ = ϵ, so t a−→ t ′. Thus, we may take α = ϵ and y = t ′. 
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